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PREFACE
The Department of Agricultural Economics (currently the Department of Agricultural and
Applied Economics) initiated an annual outlook report for Wisconsin agriculture in 1987.
Budget and staff constraints forced discontinuation of this series fo llowing the 1997
Status of Wisconsin Agriculture. The department is pleased to resume publication of
Status with this 2001 edition.
The report contains three parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the financial
environment in the Wisconsin farming sector. In Part II, market analysts review current
conditions in major Wisconsin commodity sub-sectors and offer their forecasts for 2001.
Part III contains three special articles dealing with longer-term issues facing Wisconsin
agriculture: potential cha nges in federal price and income support programs as related to
macroeconomic conditions; implications for agriculture of the state’s new “smart growth”
development strategy, and the declining contribution of agriculture to the overall
Wisconsin economy.
Additional copies of this report may be purchased for $5.00 each, including postage.
Send requests to Ms. Linda Davis, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
UW-Madison, 427 Lorch Street, Madison, WI 53706. Copies may also be downloaded
free from the Internet in either Adobe Acrobat® or MS-Word® format at
http://www.aae.wisc.edu/www/pub/
The faculty of the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics welcomes your
comments and questions on material in this report. We also encourage your suggestions
on rural Wisconsin issues that we might address in subsequent editions.
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SUMMARY
Put in the most direct terms, 2000 was a bad year for Wisconsin agriculture. Dairy
farmers, who contribute more than half of Wisconsin’s total farm cash receipts,
experienced the lowest prices in more than 20 years. The all- milk price for the year was
more than $2 per hundredweight under 1999 and almost $4 less than 1998. Wisconsin
milk checks in 2000 were a half billion dollars lighter than in 1999, causing major belttightening in all cases and negative cash flows in many. Changes in federal milk
marketing orders that took place on January 1, 2000, exacerbated the price situation by
partially insulating some regions of the country from lower prices and thus impeding
necessary supply adjustments.
The new year will bring some improvement in milk prices, as supply moves into better
balance with demand later in the year. The 2001 all- milk price in Wisconsin is expected
to be about $1 per hundredweight higher than 2000.
The price and income situation for other Wisconsin commodities in 2000 was mixed.
Cranberry growers fared much worse than dairy farmers. Season average prices for the
crop year will likely end up around $15 per barrel (100 pounds), yielding Wisconsin
growers about $40 million compared to $160 million just three years ago. Oppressive
cranberry inventories should be reduced in 2001 as low prices stimulate consumption and
marketing order restrictions cut supply.
Corn and soybean growers will likely see average prices for the 2000 crop about the same
as last year, around $1.80 per bushel for corn and $4.65 for beans. These prices are 30
percent to 35 percent below those experienced during 1995-97. But low prices for corn
and beans are being offset by large government direct payments in the form of transition
payments, loan deficiency payments, and market loss assistance. For all U.S. growers in
FY2000, USDA estimates these payments will total $9.7 billion for corn and $2.7 billion
for soybeans, about $1 per bushel. For the 2001 crop year, high fertilizer costs,
especially nitrogen, will favor soybeans over corn in much of the country. This will
likely strengthen market prices for corn and weaken the bean market. USDA is
forecasting a substantial reduction in direct payments to crop producers, but Congress is
renown for upsetting USDA farm price and income support projections.
Livestock producers fared better in 2000 than in recent years. Choice steer prices
averaged almost $4 per hundredweight over 1999, and barrows and gilts traded more than
$10 per hundredweight higher. Poultry and egg prices were mostly on par with 1999.
For 2001, cattle prices will likely be $3-$8 higher, hog prices will slip $1-$4, and poultry
products are all expected to show slightly lower prices.

iv

The overall financial condition of Wisconsin farms is strong but deteriorating. Fueled by
a buoyant state economy, farmland values have strengthened. The Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago recently reported an 8 percent increase in the value of “good” farmland in
Wisconsin between October 1999 and October 2000. This has buttressed farm balance
sheets, helping to maintain reasonably strong equity positions despite depressed farm
income. But negative cash flows are likely eroding equity faster than higher land values
are building it.

…………..

The three special articles in this year’s report address diverse long-term issues affecting
Wisconsin agriculture. William Dobson reviews the macroeconomic environment and
speculates on how the end of the “Goldilocks” U.S. economy” will affect the new farm
bill that will be debated in 2001. Douglas Jackson-Smith examines Wisconsin’s new
Smart Growth Law within the context of land use planning in rural communities. Steven
Deller and Bruce Jones look at the relative contribution of farming and food processing to
the Wisconsin economy, documenting that farming is not sharing in the economic boom
enjoyed by other sectors
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I. Financial Situation in the Wisconsin Farm Economy
Bruce Jones
(608) 265-8508

The question most asked about the
Wisconsin farm economy is, “Are
Wisconsin farmers facing a repeat of the
mid-1980’s financial crisis?” Honest
answers to this important question are, “It’s
not clear,” and “It’s too soon to say.”
There are disturbing signs of an impending
crisis. Wisconsin farmers rely on milk sales
for more than half of cash receipts. Milk
prices crashed in late 1999, and have yet to
recover. Many of the state’s dairy farmers
experienced negative cash flows throughout
2000, and nearly all dairy farmers have
tightened the belt several notches, delaying
major purchases and shelving expansion
plans. Anecdotal evidence indicates
accounts receivable in the dairy farm supply
sector are ballooning.
The income situation for other commodities
is mixed but not especially encouraging
overall. Hog prices have recovered from
devastating levels in 1998 and 1999 and
cattle prices are showing strength relative to
the mid-1990’s. Corn and soybean prices
remain very low by historical standards, but
government payments have offset some
market losses. Cranberry growers have seen
two years of prices well below production
costs.
At the same time, the balance sheet for
Wisconsin farms is relatively strong in
comparison to the mid 1980’s. Land values
are not declining, providing an equity
cushion that did not exist 15 years ago.

Debt-asset ratios are much more favorable,
at least at the moment.
It may be too soon to say there is a financial
crisis in Wisconsin agriculture. However,
that is of little solace to the farmer with his
back against the wall or the feed dealer who
has to tell that farmer that his terms of credit
have become cash and carry. Clearly, more
and more farmers in Wisconsin are
experiencing financial stress, and the
numbers could expand rapidly if milk prices
are slow to recover.
Assets and Debts
Figure 1 shows that between 1960 and 1998
the value of farm assets rose from roughly
$5 billion to nearly $27 billion while farm
debts grew from approximately $500 million
to roughly $5 billion. The net result of these
increases in farm asset values and debts was
a net worth or wealth gain of roughly $22
billion for Wisconsin farmers. These gains
in net worth, which are largely the result of
real estate appreciation, have kept the
balance sheet for the Wisconsin farming
sector strong even though farm incomes
have been depressed.
As of 1998 Wisconsin farms had only 22
cents of debt per $1 of farm assets. This
debt-to-asset ratio for the farm sector is well
below the .70 value that lenders typically set
as the upper limit for farm borrowers. This
low debt-to-asset ratio for the farm sector is

evidence that the balance sheet position for
the farm sector is relatively strong.

farmers explains why farm net incomes have
been trending downward over the last
decade or so.

Income and Expenses
Government payments as a percent of total
farm income in 1999 is now back up to the
level it was in the late 1980s. This occurred
because farmer again received payments
from the government that were intended to
offset the negative effects low commodity
prices were having on farmers’ net incomes.
Similar levels of government payments,
primarily in the form of emergency
payments were made to farmers in 2000. It
is uncertain at this time if farmers will
continue to receive income supports from
the government in 2001 and future years.

The farm income measures presented in
Figure 2 show that the total incomes of
Wisconsin farmers have been rising while
net incomes have been either holding steady
or falling. This decline in net farm incomes
that has been occurring over the last decade
is why we have continued to see a steady
decline in the number farms in the state.
The fact that net farm incomes have not
risen along with total farm incomes is
evidence that farmers’ profit margins have
been eroded over time. This decline in
profit margins, which is typically identified
as one of the characteristics of highly
competitive markets, is evidence that
farmers are being squeezed by low
commodity prices and high production costs.

Relative Debt Positions of Wisconsin
Farmers

Figure 2 shows that in the last half of the
1980s net farm incomes rose before they
started to descend in the 1990s. This
increase in net farm incomes in the late
1980s was largely the result of federal farm
programs that paid substantial sums of
money to Wisconsin farmers in the form of
price supports and other subsidies. Without
these government payments net farm
incomes would not have risen in the 1980s.

Two financial measures are presented in
Figure 4 that reflect the relative debt
positions of Wisconsin farmers. One
measure is the net- income-to-debt ratio,
which reflects the amount of net income
Wisconsin farmers earn per dollar of debt.
The other measure is the ratio of assets-todebts, which indicates the value of assets
farmers have per dollar of debt. High values
for these two ratios indicate the farm
economy is strong while low values are
signs that the farm economies financial
position is relatively weak.

Figure 3 illustrates how important
government payments have been to
Wisconsin farmers the last couple of
decades. During the 1985 to 1989 period,
government payments represented 10 to 17
percent of farmers’ total income in any
given year. Throughout most of the 1990s,
government payments comprised less than
10 percent of farmers’ total income. This
cut back in government payments for

Figure 4 shows that the farm economy’s
financial strength has declined over the last
four decades. The farm sector’s asset-todebt position has declined at a modest rate
indicating that farmers are borrowing more
money relative to the value of their assets.
More alarming is the dramatic decline in the
farm sectors net- income-to-debt positions.
Over time farmers’ use of credit has
increased dramatically relative to net farm
2

income. This latter trend is a cause for some
concern because it indicates that farmers’
ability to service their debt commitments is
declining. This downtrend in the net income
to debt ratio cannot continue indefinitely.
Lenders will not loan increased amounts of
money to farmers if farm incomes do not
rise to levels that allow farmers to retire
debts to in an orderly and timely manner.

If lenders start clamping down on new loans
to farm borrowers, farmers may have to start
liquidating land and other assets to repay
their existing debts or get the money to fund
their day to day operations. This liquidation
of farm assets will solve farmers’ short run
capital problems but it will further erode the
state’s farm economy, and force even more
farmers to leave the industry.

Figure 1: Wisconsin Farm Assets and Debts
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Figure 2: Wisconsin Farm Income
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Figure 3: Government Payments as a Percent of U.S. Total Farm
Income
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Figure 4: Debt Ratios for Wisconsin Farms
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II. Current Outlook for Wisconsin Agricultural Commodities and
Inputs
In this section, marketing and farm management specialists in the Department of
Agricultural and Applied Economics provide their insights on economic conditions for
Wisconsin agriculture by commodity sub-sector. Interested readers are encouraged to
contact the authors for more current or more detailed information

Dairy Situation and Outlook

six months, the Class III price averaged
below $10 per hundredweight and only
slightly above $10 for the second six
months. The average Class III price for
2000 is estimated at $9.73 per
hundredweight, $2.70 lower than the
comparable Basic Formula Price (BFP)
in 1999 and $4.47 lower than the record
BFP set in 1998. The average all- milk

Bob Cropp
(608) 262-9483
Dairy farmers experienced record high
milk prices in 1998 and relatively strong
milk prices for 1999. In contrast, 2000
saw very depressed prices throughout
the entire year (Table 1). For the first

Table 1: BFP/Class III & Average All-milk Prices, Wisconsin and U.S., 1998- 2000
and Forecast for 2001 (Dollars Per Hundredweight) *
Month

1998
BFP
13.25
13.32
12.81
12.01
10.88
13.10
14.77
14.99
15.10
16.04
16.84
17.34
14.20
15.50
15.50

Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Nov
Dec
Average BFP/Class III
Average WI All- milk Price
Average U.S. All- milk Price
* The BFP was replaced by the Class III price in 2000
** Estimated
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1999
BFP
16.27
10.27
11.62
11.81
11.26
11.42
13.59
15.79
16.26
11.49
9.79
9.63
12.43
13.86
14.36

2000
Class III
10.05
9.54
9.54
9.41
9.37
9.46
10.66
10.13
10.76
10.02
8.57
9.30**
9.73
11.58
12.30

2001
Class III
9.50
9.70
9.60
9.70
9.95
10.25
10.90
11.30
11.85
11.90
11.50
11.30
10.62
12.40
13.10

price to Wisconsin dairy farmers is
estimated to be $11.58 per
hundredweight for 2000, compared to
$13.86 for 1999 and a record $15.50 in
1998.

combined total of about 128,000 more
cows than a year ago.
With low milk prices, we expect dairy
expansions to slow and milk cow
numbers not to increase in 2001. The
average number of cows for 2001 is
forecast to stay the same at 9.22 million
head.

In 2000, milk prices fell to levels not
seen since 1978. Prices for year 2001
are forecast to recover slowly, with an
average Class III price of $10.62 per
hundredweight and an average all- milk
price of $12.40 for Wisconsin. While
these prices are still low, this is a more
optimistic forecast than what others have
predicted and higher than current Class
III futures market prices.

Cheap feed and favorable weather
during most of 1999 and 2000 resulted
in excellent milk production per cow
(Figure 6). While milk prices have been
low, the milk- feed-price ratio 2 remained
relatively strong (Figure 7). A ratio of
3.0 or above favors herd expansion.
U.S. milk per cow averaged 17,771 for
1999, an increase of 3.4 percent over
1998, and milk per cow increased to
18,286 for 2000, another 2.9 percent
increase. Increases in milk per cow may
slow some in 2001, but an increase of at
least 2.1 percent to 18,670 pounds
appears reasonable.

Why did milk prices collapse in the last
quarter of 1999 and stay down through
2000 and into 2001? Record high milk
prices in 1998 and continued strong
prices in 1999 along with relatively
cheap feed encouraged dairy expansions,
particularly in western states. Milk cow
numbers normally decline each year, but
this did not happen in 1999 or 2000
(Figure 5). Cow numbers increased only
slightly in 1999, from an average of 9.15
million head to 9.16 million head. The
increase was 0.7 percent in 2000, to an
average of 9.22 million head 1 . Cow
numbers increased each month during
2000.

Total milk production for 2000 increased
3.6 percent to 168.6 billion pounds
(Figure 8). With no change in milk cow
numbers and an increase in milk per cow
of 2.1 percent, we can expect about
172.1 billion pounds of milk for 2001.

This was not the case for Wisconsin and
Minnesota. Cow numbers declined about
0.7 percent in Wisconsin and 2.5 percent
in Minnesota for a total loss of about
25,000 cows. But due to expansions in
the West, California, Washington, Idaho,
Arizona and New Mexico had a

With increases in milk production, the
production of dairy products is also
higher. From January through October
2000, as compared to a year earlier, the
production of cheese was up 5.3 percent,
butter production up 2.9 percent and
nonfat dry milk production up 8.4
percent.

1

2

This outlook was written prior to final 2000
production numbers released by USDA. Final
numbers are likely to be different from what are
reported here .

The number pounds of 16% mixed dairy feed
equal in value to one pound of whole milk. The
feed includes alfalfa hay, corn and soybeans.
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A strong economy has kept commercial
disappearance strong. Commercial
disappearance increased 3.1 percent to
164.9 billion pounds in 1999, and for
2000 commercial disappearance may
total near 169.8 billion pounds, an
increase of more than 2.5 percent.
Compared to a year ago, commercial
disappearance for the period of January
through September was up 2.0 percent
for American cheese, 7.4 percent for
other types of cheese, unchanged for
butter, down 5.2 percent for nonfat dry
milk, down 0.7 percent for fluid
(beverage) milk and up 2.8 percent for
all dairy products on a milkfat equivalent
basis. Commercial disappearance is
expected to grow another 2.5 percent
during 2001 and reach a total of 174
billion pounds.

1999 and 4.0 billion pounds in 1998.
This increase was mostly due to major
increases in CCC purchases of nonfat
dry milk and some cheese purchases for
the last quarter of 2000. CCC purchases
probably will decline only slightly in
2001 since nonfat dry milk prices will
remain at support levels.
Dairy imports and exports have little
impact on milk prices since on a total
solids milk equivalent basis imports
closely match exports. The concern with
imports is the growing and unrestricted
imports of ultra milk proteins. These are
likely replacing some of the use of
domestic nonfat dry milk and adding to
CCC purchases of nonfat dry milk under
the support program.
Table 2 summarizes changes in the dairy
supply and demand situation3 : Milk
production estimates shown for 2001 can
easily change. Milk cow numbers could
decline rather than remain unchanged.
Weather can significantly impact milk
per cow. But with the information now
available these estimates are reasonable.
If milk production does turn out lower,
then the forecasted milk prices for the
second half of 2001 will be higher. It
will be important for dairy producers to
watch market developments. If market
prices show more strength, producers
may wish to protect better prices with
price risk management tools, whether it
be cash forward contracts with a milk
buyer, hedging on the futures market,
buying a put option, or some
combination.

While commercial disappearance has
been strong, the increase in milk and
dairy product production was greater.
The result was a build- up in dairy stocks.
Total cheese stocks as of October 30th ,
were 9 percent higher than a year ago
(Figure 9), and nonfat dry milk stocks
were more than double. Butter stocks
were 10 percent lower, but had been
higher earlier in the year (Figure 10).
These stocks are well above the 5-year
average. Not until stocks are reduced,
particularly stocks of cheese, will farm
level milk prices improve. With the
increase in milk production slowing
during 2001 and continued growth in
commercial disappearance, stocks
should decline slowly and add some
strength to 2001 milk prices.
With the depressed milk prices, CCC
removals under the dairy price support
program are estimated to total about 8.0
billion pounds (skim milk equivalent) in
2000, up from the 6.5 billion pounds in

No major changes in federal dairy policy
are expected before 2002, when a new
farm bill will be written. But some
3

Data for this table and in the report are drawn
from USDA, NASS reports.
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Table 2: Milk Supply and Demand Summary

Item
Milk Cows –000-

1998
9,154

1999
9,156

2000 Est
9,220

2001 Est
9220

Milk/cow

17,189

17,771

18,286

18,670

Total Milk-B Lbs.

157.3

162.7

168.6

172.1

Marketings- B Lbs.

156.1

161.3

167.2

170.7

Beg. Stocks- B Lbs

4.9

5.3

6.1

7.2

Imports- B Lbs.

4.6

4.8

4.5

4.5

165.6

171.4

177.8

182.4

5.3

6.1

7.2

6.4

0.4
(4.0 skim)

0.3
(6.5 skim)

0.8
(8.0 skim)

2.0
(7.5 skim)

159.9
(156.0)

164.9
(157.8)

169.8
(161.7)

174.0
(166.5)

Total Supply- B Lbs.
End Stocks- B Lbs.
Net removals- B Lbs.
Commercial
Disappearance

intervening changes could affect milk
prices in 2001.

formulas to yield higher advanced Class
IV skim milk prices than advanced Class
III skim milk prices. On average for
year, the Class IV skim milk value was
$1.80 per hundredweight higher than the
Class III value, with the difference as
great as $3.61 for December.

The federal order reform that was
implemented January 1, 2000, had a
significant impact on milk prices and
milk production in 2000. The Basic
Formula Price (BFP) as a mover of Class
I milk prices was replaced by the higher
of an advanced Class IV skim milk price
(milk used for nonfat dry milk) or
advanced Class III skim milk price (milk
used for cheese). These class skim milk
prices are derived from component
pricing formulas. During most of 2000,
cheese prices were depressed because of
surplus milk production. Nonfat dry
milk prices, supported at a relatively
high level, were close to CCC purchase
prices. But butter prices were well
above support, which caused the

This increased the effective Class I
differential as measured by the
difference between the Class I and Class
III prices. The Class I market was
isolated from the low cheese prices
caused by surplus milk production.
Dairy producers in markets where milk
is used predominately for cheese – in
particular Wisconsin and Minnesota
received low cheese milk prices.
Producers in Class I (beverage) markets
were partially insulated from the surplus
milk situation. As can be seen in Table

9

1, the decline in the U.S all- milk price in
2000 from 1999 was not as great as the
decline in the Class III price or the
decline in the Wisconsin average allmilk price. This has delayed the
reduction in milk production needed to
improve milk prices.

been near the support price of $1.01 per
pound non- fortified or $1.02 per pound
fortified (Figure 11). Butter prices have
been well above the $0.668 per pound
support price. Except for the last quarter
of 2000, 40-pound cheddar cheese
blocks have been above the $1.122 per
pound support price. The cost of the
dairy price support program has
increased because of growing purchases
of surplus nonfat dry milk. Since the
beginning of the fiscal year, October 1,
2000, through early December 2000,
CCC purchases of nonfat dry milk were
5 times greater than for the same period
a year earlier.

U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Glickman
was instructed by Congress to review the
Class IV and Class III formulas and
implement any changes by January 1,
2001. On December 1 st , the Secretary
did just that with a tentative final
decision to amend the formulas. These
changes were approved by a producer
referendum in December and
implemented on January 1, 2000. The
industry has until February 5 to
comment on the changes. The Secretary
will subsequently issue a final decision
that producers must also approve via
referendum.

The U.S Secretary of Agriculture has the
authority and the responsibility to
minimize the cost of the dairy price
support program by “tilting” the CCC
purchase support price away from nonfat
dry milk (lower price) to butter (higher
price). Lower prices for nonfat dry milk
would reduce the advanced Class IV
milk price under the current formulas
and the formulas included in the
tentative final decision. Resulting lower
Class I milk prices would encourage a
greater slow-down in milk production
and a quicker strengthening of milk
prices nationally. But, as of now, dairy
producers need to make decisions based
on milk prices like those forecasted
above.

The cha nges in the tentative final
decision do not address the “higher of”
problem discussed above. In fact, the
decision virtually ensures that the
advanced Class IV 3.5 percent butterfat
milk price will be the mover of Class I,
thus effectively de-coupling Class I
prices from cheese prices.
For the past two years the only dairy
product that has been in surplus has been
nonfat dry milk. Nonfat dry milk has

10

Figure 5: Milk Cow Numbers, 20 States, 1999-2000
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Figure 6: Milk per Cow, 20 States, 1999-2000
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Figure 7: Milk-Feed Price Ratio, 1999-2000
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Figure 8: Total U.S. Milk Production, 1999-2000
15000
Adjusted to 30-day month
14500

1999
2000

14000

Million Pounds

13500
13000
12500
12000
11500
11000
10500
10000
Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

12

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Figure 9: End-of-Month American Cheese Stocks, 1999-2000
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Figure 10: End-of-Month Butter Stocks, 1999-2000
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Figure 11: CME Monthly Average Dairy Product Prices, 1999-2000
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Livestock and Poultry Outlook
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since 1982 except one (1998), should
also post a moderate increase in the new
year.

Patrick Luby
(608) 262-6074

Domestic meat demand, helped by
record employment and consumer
incomes, has been strong and led to a
moderate rise in retail meat prices during
the past year. A slowing economy and
rising energy costs may blunt demand
growth in 2001 but retail meat prices are
likely to again show a moderate rise.

Overview
U.S. meat production has increased for
each of the last 18 years and is likely to
post another modest gain in 2001. The
decade-long moderate rise in beef
production may end in 2001 with a mild
decline in beef output. Following a
small reduction in 2000, pork production
should edge upward in 2001. Pork
production has not experienced
back-to-back annual declines since the
economic recession years of 1981 and
1982. Broiler output, up every year in
the last four decades except one (1973),
should record another modest gain in
2001. Turkey production, up every year

An impressive decade- long increase in
meat exports has stalled and leveled off
during the last several years. This
slowing of exports has occurred because
of economic disruptions in various
importing countries and a strong and
rising dollar. Net exports are likely to
continue to trend sidewise in 2001.
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Record U.S. corn and soybean crops in
2000 provide a favorable base for
continued expansion of meat production
during the next year or two. However,
strong demand for grain and meal may
cause feed prices to rise from the very
low levels of the past two or three years.
Other developments, such as food safety
concerns, genetically modified
organisms in crops, mad cow disease in
parts of Europe and the potential
elimination of bone meal in animal feed
may become very important
considerations in the financial results of
the livestock and poultry industries in
2001.

of poultry and livestock on farms and
ranches have contributed to these
production increases. Favorable weather
during the last several years has also
helped. Large corn and soybean crops,
moderate summers and mild winters
have all been favorable for producing
livestock and poultry. Stronger
consumer demand for poultry, and in
particular for broilers, has directed a
larger proportion of the resources into
poultry production relative to beef and
pork during the 1980’s and 1990’s.
Average slaughter weights of animals
and birds in 2000 were much higher than
in 1982 and have been a large factor in
the increase in meat production. The
average weight of broilers slaughtered in
2000 was up over 20 percent since 1982.
The average weight of turkeys
slaughtered increased 32 percent in the
last 18 years.

Meat Production Continues to Set New
Record Highs
Meat production in the U.S. increased
during 2000 for the 18th consecutive
year. Meat production increased about
1 percent in 2000, less than the average
2.7 percent annual increases during the
previous 17 years. Beef, broilers and
turkey recorded modest production gains
in 2000 while pork output declined about
2 percent.

Average weights of cattle and hogs have
also increased. The average dressed
weight of steers increased 14 percent
from 1982 to 2000 while the average
dressed weight of heifers rose 21
percent. The average dressed weight of
hogs rose 13 percent despite the smaller
proportion of heavier weight sows in the
total slaughter.

During the last 18 years, total meat
output has risen about 58 percent.
Broiler output rose 151 percent from
1982 to 2000 while turkey production
climbed 120 percent, pork production
increased 34 percent and beef output
rose 20 percent. The increase in broiler
production accounted for nearly
60 percent of the total gain in meat
production and the increase in combined
broiler and turkey output accounted for
nearly 70 percent of the total increase
from 1982 to 2000.

The increase in average weights has had
positive effects on efficiencies of
production and marketing. The need for
animal housing, slaughtering, breaking
and boning facilities as well as other
production inputs has not risen as fast as
the increases in total meat production as
a result of the ability to feed to heavier
weights while still maintaining or
improving the quality of the meat
produced.

Improvements in management, genetics,
housing and nutrition in the production
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Export Boom Has Leveled Off

reached in 1971. Turkey consumption
per capita has been flat since 1990 with a
range of 17.6 to 18.5 pounds each year,
up from 11.0 pounds in 1984 and only
4.5 pounds in 1965. However, broiler
consumption has continued to rise to a
new high of about 77 pounds in 1999
and 2000, up from 48.3 pounds in 1983
and only 23.5 pounds in 1960.

The decade long rise in exports of most
meats that began in the mid-1980’s has
leveled off during the last several years
(Figure 12). Spurred by severe
economic problems in the first half of
the 1980’s, the livestock and meat
industry aggressively financed the
promotion of its products in international
markets. A weakening dollar and
rapidly growing economies, particularly
in Southeast Asia, and an improving
quality of U.S. produced meat helped in
the success of the marketing effort.
However, in the last several years, a
slowdown in certain markets,
particularly in Southeast Asia and
Russia, along with a strengthening
dollar, have slowed the export growth.

Beef Production May Turn Down in
2001
Beef production rose about 18 percent
from the cyclical low in 1990 to 2000.
Nearly half of that increase resulted from
the rise in average weights of animals at
slaughter. The beef production cycle
usually follows the cattle numbers cycle
by several years and the number of cattle
and calves on farms and ranches peaked
at 103.5 million head in 1996 and fell to
99.0 million head in 2000. A further
small decline is expected in 2001.

Meat Consumption Per Capita in 2000
Nearly Matches 1999 Record
The all time record high of 220.4 pounds
of meat consumed per capita in the U.S.
in 1999 was nearly matched in 2000.
Consumption per person of beef was up
slightly, pork consumption was down a
bit while poultry consumption per
person was little changed.

Slowly rising cattle slaughter and a
decline in the U.S. calf drop, down from
40.2 million in 1995 to 38.7 million in
2000, has cut into total cattle numbers
and should lead to reduced cattle
slaughter for the next several years,
beginning in 2001. The downward
phase of the production cycle is not
expected to last more than several years
but should support a rise in cattle prices
during that time.

During the last decade, per capita
consumption of beef, pork and turkey
has trended sidewise while rising broiler
consumption has accounted for
practically all of the gain in the rise in
total meat consumed per person.

Choice cattle prices are cyclical and
averaged $75.37 per live cwt. for the six
years from 1988 through 1993.
However, during the last seven years
from 1994 through 2000, they averaged
only about $66.25, reaching a low of
$61.75 in 1998 (Figure 14). They rose
to nearly $66.00 in 1999 and to about
$69.00 in 2000. They should average

Beef consumption per person, which
peaked at 94.4 pounds in 1976, has been
in a narrow range of 65 to 69 pounds for
the last 12 years. Pork consumption per
person has also trended sidewise
between 48 and 54 pound for the last 19
years. A high of 60.6 pounds had been
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above $70 in 2001 as they did in each of
the six years from 1988 through 1993.

produce a few more highly valued
calves.

Feeder Cattle Prices Strong

Cow prices (Boning Utility, Sioux Falls)
have strengthened from their cyclical
low of just over $30 in 1996, the lowest
average annual price since 1977 to about
$42 in 2000. A further moderate rise is
likely in 2001 as slaughter numbers
retreat toward their cyclical low.

Feeder cattle prices have been strong in
2000 and should continue strong in 2001
and for several years beyond if feed
prices remain moderate. In April 1995,
feeder cattle (750-800 lbs., Oklahoma
City) reached a low of $53.10 under the
weight of low and falling choice cattle
prices and very high and rising corn
prices that reached a record all time high
one month later. The April 1995 low in
feeder cattle prices was the lowest in 17
years.

Pork Production to Increase Slowly
Pork production declined about
2 percent in 2000 following two years of
poor financial results. A huge increase
in pork production in 1998 led to very
low hog prices in late 1998 and into
1999. Total pork output increased
1.7 billion pounds in 1998 over 1997,
more than the total increase of
1.6 billion pounds that took place during
the preceding eight years from 1989 to
1997. The mild decline in pork output
that began in late 1999 should continue
into early 2001 and then be followed by
a modest increase. A rise of 2 to 3
percent is expected for the calendar year.

Feeder cattle prices in 2000 averaged
about $86, nearly $10 higher than in
1999, and much higher than the cyclical
low of $61.08 in 1996. The 2000 price
average threatened the record high of
$88.27 in 1990 and subsequent highs of
$88 in 1991 and $86.45 in 1993. Driven
by stronger choice cattle prices and
moderate feed prices, feeder cattle prices
should rise again in 2001 and should
exceed the record high set in 1990.

The hog-pork industry has enjoyed
excellent weather for production
increases during the past several years
mild winters, moderate summer
temperatures, good crops and resulting
low feed prices. Unfavorable weather in
2001 would make production increases
more difficult. Pork production has not
declined for two consecutive calendar
years since 1980-1982.

Cow Slaughter Low, Prices Up
Federally Inspected cow slaughter of
about 5.4 million head in 2000 was the
lowest since a similar number in 1972
and 1970 and otherwise the lowest since
1964. Cow slaughter reached a cyclical
high in 1996 during the year of record
high corn prices and has fallen
24 percent in the last four years. During
that time, dairy cow slaughter fell
14 percent and beef cow slaughter
declined 32 percent. Cow slaughter
should decline a little more in 2001 as
the cow and calf industry attempts to

Hog prices averaged about $32 per live
cwt. in 1998 and $34 in 1999, the lowest
annual averages since 1972. Even
considering the vast improvements in
production efficiencies and the relatively
low feed costs, most producers
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experienced very difficult financial
times. However, hog prices averaged
nearly $45.00 in 2000 and were
apparently high enough to stem the
production decline.

percent achieved from 1984 through
1999. The nearly 7 percent increase in
broiler production in 1999, a record
annual increase of 1.9 billion pounds, a
larger one year increase than the huge
increase in pork production in 1998,
caused prices to decline and resulted in
disappointing financial returns in both
1999 and 2000. A more difficult export
environment during the last several years
also contributed to the lower prices and
declining financial returns.

In the USDA quarterly survey of hog
producers on September 1, producers
said they intended to increase autumn
(September-November) farrowings by
1 percent and winter (December February) farrowings by 3 percent. This
would indicate, given normal weather,
that pork production would begin to
exceed year ago levels by the second
quarter of 2001. It would also indicate
that any production increase in 2001
would be of modest proportions.

The explosive demand growth for broiler
meat over the years has resulted in a
very large industry where percentage
increases achieved in the past are
probably less likely in the future because
they result in huge poundage increases,
too large for the domestic demand to
absorb. Unless export growth returns to
the pre-1997 levels, the broiler industry
will likely have to be content with a
smaller annual percentage growth than it
enjoyed in the past.

The anticipated cut back in beef output
in 2001 should help pork demand and
unless the general economy falls into a
recession, average hog prices in 2001
should be near those of 2000, in the low
to mid-40’s.
The structure and location of the hog
production industry changed rapidly
during the 1990’s as the number of
producers declined and the average size
increased. The proportion of hogs raised
in the traditional Mid-West Corn Belt
declined as significant increases
occurred elsewhere, most notably in
North Carolina. While these trends may
continue in the new decade, it appears
that the momentum of change is
slowing.

Helped by one additional weekday in
2001 compared with 2000 (2000 had one
less weekday than 1999), broiler output
should again slowly expand by
2 to 3 percent in 2001. Along with less
competition from the beef industry, this
should permit better financial results
than the broiler industry has experienced
during the past two years.

Broiler Production Increase Slowing

Turkey production, after exploding in
the late 1980’s, and growing in the early
1990’s, declined in the late 1990's for
the first time in years. Turkey output
rose 77 percent in the six years form
1984 to 1990, then rose another

Turkey Expansion Continues To Be
Moderate

Broiler output set a new record high in
2000 for the 26th consecutive year but
the increase of a little over 1 percent was
the smallest in 18 years and far below
the average annual increase of 5.6
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20 percent during the next six years to
1996. However, the pace of production
outran the pace of demand, causing
frozen inventories of turkey to rise to
record large levels, prices to tumble and
financial results to deteriorate. As a
result, production in 1999 fell 3 percent
below that of 1996, unheard of in the
industry in recent decades.

when, fortunately for the industry, feed
prices were low.
Egg production rose about 2 percent
from 1999 to 2000. Another rise of
about 1 percent is expected in 2001.
Wholesale egg prices in 2000 have been
about unchanged from a year earlier.
Again, little change in the annual
average prices for eggs is expected in
2001.

With the three-year cutback in
production, frozen inventories were
reduced to the lowest levels in more than
a decade and with the help of low feed
costs, profitability returned to the
industry. A moderate production
increase of about 2 percent took place in
2000 and a rise of about 3 percent is
expected in 2001.

Retail Meat Prices Higher in 2000;
Further Rise Expected in 2001
The record high employment and
consumer income in 2000, along with
only a modest increase in meat
production, resulted in a faster rise in
retail meat prices in 2000 after nearly a
decade of mostly small increases. In the
inflationary years of 1987 to 1991, retail
meat prices rose at nearly the 5.0 percent
annual average rate of the increase in the
total Consumer Price Index (CPI). In the
following disinflationary eight years
from 1991 to 1999, retail meat prices
rose less than the 2.6 percent average
annual rise in the CPI. Inflation, as
measured by the CPI, rose about 3.4
percent in 2000 and meat prices rose at
an even faster rate. (Table 3)

The average price of whole turkey hens
in 2000 was the highest in 14 years and
the highest ever except for the three- year
period from 1984 through 1986.
However, prices for most of the turkey
parts such as breastmeat, thighmeat,
wings, drums and mechanically
separated turkey meat were well below
their previous highs. Average prices in
2001 should be near those of 2000 and
should feed costs remain moderate, the
industry should be able to avoid the
financial problems of the mid and late
1990’s.

Table 3: Annual Average Percentage
Change in Retail Meat Prices and
Consumer Price Index

Egg Production, Prices Steady In 2001
Egg output has witnessed a moderate,
steady rise since the industry's last
annual production downturn in 1989.
However, the increase in recent years, up
10 percent from 1996 to 2000, caused
wholesale egg prices to tumble 26
percent from their high in 1996, when
feed prices were very high, to 2000

Beef & Veal
Pork
Poultry
Red Meat
CPI
p=Preliminary
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1987- 1991- 199991
99
2000p
5.7
0.6
6.3
3.9
1.2
7.5
4.1
2.4
4.1
4.9
0.9
6.0
5.0
2.6
3.4

Retail meat prices tend to rise unevenly
from year to year. Retail poultry prices
declined 1 percent from 1989 to 1992,
then surged 19 percent during the
following five years before rising only 3
percent from 1997 to 2000. The rise,
then the decline in poultry exports
partially explains the uneven price
advances during the last eight years.

helped retail pork prices rise 13 percent
in one year from 1989 to 1990, then
climb only a total of 4 percent during the
following five years before jumping 16
percent from 1995 to 1997. They then
fell 6 percent during the next two years.
The modest increase in total meat
production in 2001 will help support
meat prices in 2001. However, an
expected slower rise in employment and
consumer incomes may be a tempering
factor. The anticipated decline in beef
output will likely keep beef prices
advancing. However, pork and poultry
prices may not rise as fast as in the past
year.

The workings of the beef production
cycle helped retail beef prices to lurch
upward a total of 30 percent from 1986
to 1990, slow to a 6 percent increase
from 1990 to 1993 and to less than a 2
percent gain from 1993 to 1999.
Likewise, cyclical hog production

Figure 12: Annual Net Foreign Trade of Livestock Products as a Percent of
Production
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Figure 13: Average Annual Farm-Level Prices, Hogs and Poultry
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Figure 14: Annual Average Farm-Level Cattle Prices
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Corn and Soybean Outlook

production has been less stable. For
example, in 1999 Wisconsin growers
produced a much larger percentage of
the national corn crop than they did in
2000. This brought more volatility in
local prices relative to the mid-1990’s,
and has increased basis volatility from
year to year (basis is the difference
between the local cash price and the
futures price for the same commodity).

Randy Fortenbery
(608) 262-4908
Introduction
For the fifth consecutive year, U.S.
national average corn and soybean yields
were at or above trend line levels. This
is the first five-year string of back-toback good-to-excellent crops in well
over 30 years. While this is an amazing
accomplishment from a production
perspective, this trend has had a negative
impact on average price levels.

Corn
As of December 2000, the U.S. corn
crop for the 2000/01 marketing year
(September 1, 2000 through August 31,
2001) was estimated at 10.05 billion
bushels. This is essentially equal to the
record crop of 1994, but unlike 1994, the
2000 crop followed an excellent
production year.

Wisconsin, like the nation in general,
also turned out excellent crops the last
several years. However, Wisconsin’s
production as a percentage of national

Table 4: US Corn Balance Sheet (Sep/Aug)

Marketing Year

USDA
95/96

USDA
96/97

USDA
USDA
97/98
98/99
Million Bushels
426
883
1,308
13
9
19

Beg Stocks
Imports

1,558
16

Acres Planted
Acres Harvested
% Harvested
Yield
Production
Total Supply

71.2
65.0
91.3%
113.5
7,374
8,948

79.2
72.6
91.7%
127.2
9,233
9,672

79.5
72.7
91.4%
126.6
9,207
10,099

Feed & residual
Food/Seed/Ind.
Exports
Total Demand

4,696
1,598
2,228
8,522

5,302
1,692
1,795
8,789

426
5.00%
$3.24

Ending Stocks
Stocks To Use
Avg. Farm Price

USDA
99/00

USDA
DEC EST.
00/01

1,787
15

1,715
10

80.2
72.6
90.5%
134.4
9,759
11,085

77.4
70.5
91.1%
133.8
9,437
11,239

79.6
73.0
91.7%
137.7
10,054
11,779

5,505
1,782
1,504
8,791

5,496
1,822
1,981
9,298

5,676
1,913
1,935
9,524

5,850
1,975
2,200
10,025

883
10.04%

1,308
14.88%

1,787
19.22%

1,715
18.01%

1,754
17.50%

$2.71

$2.43

$1.94

$1.80
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$1.85

Wisconsin corn production totaled
363 million bushels in 2000 (November
estimate), a reduction of almost
11 percent over 1999. The smaller
Wisconsin crop relative to the national
crop has resulted in excellent basis
appreciation following the 2000 harvest
season, and good storage returns early in
the year. However, in many parts of
northern Wisconsin, storage
opportunities beyond the first of the year
will be limited. Basis appreciation has
already resulted in basis levels not
normally seen until later in the year, and
any additional returns to storage will
need to come from a futures market
rally.

$2 per bushel, reflecting the current run
of good to excellent production, and an
associated build up in end-of- marketingyear stocks.
End-of- year stocks (referred to as the
carryout) represent the market’s cushion
against a crop production problem in the
next harvest, and have a direct influence
on both the average price level through
the current marketing year, as well as
prices offered for delivery commitments
following the next harvest. In general,
the larger the anticipated carryout, the
lower the average price during the
marketing year, and the lower the preharvest price offerings for the next
harvested crop.

The smaller Wisconsin crop in 2000
resulted from a 3.5 percent reduction in
corn acres, and an 11-bushel per acre
reduction over the record yields of 1999.
Corn yields across Wisconsin in 2000
averaged 132 bushels per acre, down
from 143 bushels per acre in 1999.
Despite the large reduction relative to
the previous year, however, the current
yield ties with 1997 as the fourth highest
Wisconsin corn yield on record.

Without a serious planting or production
problem next year, ending stocks in
2001/02 will not be reduced appreciably
from the current projection for 2000/01.
Therefore, producers need to reconsider
what constitutes an attractive price
guarantee for 2001 produced corn as
they progress through the production
season. The current price levels of both
energy and chemical inputs (especially
fertilizer) suggest that corn acres could
be reduced next year. However, as
Wisconsin’s recent experience suggests,
a slight reduction in acres does not
necessarily translate into a significant
reduction in corn production. Further,
any acreage reductions are most likely to
come from the Western corn-producing
areas (for example the Dakotas) where
acres were most recently brought into
production. This means acres taken out
of corn production because of high input
costs (at least in the first year) will be
those with the lowest yield potential
already. It is unlikely that the traditional
corn soybean rotations in the true Corn
Belt will be significantly altered with

Harvested corn acres in Wisconsin have
been falling steadily since 1996, but
until this past season higher yields had
more than compensated for declining
acres. Wisconsin harvested fewer corn
acres in 2000 than in any year since
1993. Before that, you have to go back
to the 1988 drought to find fewer
harvested corn acres.
Average price levels for corn, both
nationally and in Wisconsin, have drifted
lower the last three years. As seen from
Figure 16, the average cash price for
corn was about $2.25 per bushel in the
early and mid-1990’s. It is now below
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just one year of high input prices. If the
current input-cost-to-corn-price ratio
persists into another production season, a
more dramatic shift from corn
production could occur. However, the
possibility of that happening probably
won’t have a significant impact on corn
prices in coming months.

strongly favors the production of
soybeans rather than corn and spring and
winter wheat. As a result, some of the
most dramatic increases in soybean
acreage happened on land formerly
planted to wheat. In North Dakota
alone, soybean acres were increased
about 50 percent relative to 1999, and
now total over 2 million acres. When
South Dakota is included, the combined
increase in soybean acres is almost 1
million. This more than offset acreage
declines in other states.

Soybeans
The year 2000 continued to see
aggressive increases in soybean acres
nationally and in Wisconsin. Soybean
acres in the nation have increased
rapidly since 1992, and in recent years
have been heavily influenced by the
current government farm program. The
current loan program, and associated
loan deficiency payments (LDP),

The Dakota experience is also reflected
in Upper Midwest acreage allocations.
Wisconsin grew 150,000 more acres of
soybeans in 2000 than in 1999. In
addition, Minnesota added 200,000 acres
and Michigan added 250,000 acres. U.S.

Table 5: US Soybean Balance Sheet (Sep/Aug)

Marketing Year
Beg Stocks
Imports
Acres Planted
Acres Harvested
% Harvested
Yield
Production
Total Supply

USDA
95/96
335
5

USDA
96/97

USDA
USDA
97/98
98/99
Million Bushels
183
132
200
9
5
3

USDA
99/00

USDA
DEC
00/01

348
4

288
3

62.6
61.6
98.4%
35.3
2,177
2,517

64.2
63.3
98.6%
37.6
2,380
2,572

70
69.1
98.7%
38.9
2,689
2,826

72
70.4
97.8%
38.9
2,741
2,944

73.7
72.4
98.2%
36.6
2,654
3,006

74.5
73.0
98.0%
38.0
2,777
3,068

Crush Sep/Aug
Exports
F/S/R
Total Demand

1,370
851
111
2,332

1,436
882
123
2,441

1,597
873
156
2,626

1,590
801
205
2,595

1,579
970
170
2,719

1,605
975
167
2,747

Ending Stocks
Stocks To Use

185
7.93%

131
5.37%

200
7.60%

348
13.41%

288
10.59%

320
11.65%

Avg. Farm Price

$6.77

$7.35

$6.47

$4.93

$4.65

$4.70
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soybean production is rapidly expanding
north and west from traditional
production areas.

continue to increase, putting even more
downward pressure on market prices. A
look at average weekly prices for the
nearby soybean futures contract (the
futures contract closest to maturity)
shows just how much average prices
have changed (Figure 18). Prior to
1997, futures prices for soybeans
averaged about $6.25 to $6.35 per
bushel. Prices below $5 were almost
unheard of, and never lasted long if they
did occur.

Like corn, soybean yields have remained
healthy for each of the last five years.
The combination of stable yields and
aggressive acreage growth has resulted
in several recent record soybean crops,
including the 2000 crop.
From Figure 17, note that soybean
production, both nationally and in
Wisconsin, remained stable through the
1980’s. Beginning in the early 1990’s,
however, large acreage increases
brought increased year-over-year
production. Growth in Wisconsin was
particularly strong. Wisconsin soybean
production in 2000 was five times what
it was 12 years ago, reflecting growth in
acreage and improved yields. In 1980
the average Wisconsin soybean yield
was 33 bushels per acre. By 1990, it had
increased to 41 bushels per acre, and in
1999 averaged 46 bushels per acre. The
record average yield for Wisconsin came
in 1998 at 47 bushels per acre. The
average yield in 2000 was 40 bushels per
acre, a bit of a disappointment relative to
the previous two years, but still well
above the averages expected just a few
years ago.

While average corn prices have fallen,
soybean prices have fallen much more.
The average cash price for soybeans now
is 75 cents or so lower than it was just 4
or 5 years ago. The most attractive
pricing strategy for producers in this
environment has been to forward-price
next year’s production when futures
prices reach the upper $5 range (a price
associated with the absolute bottom of
the potential price range in earlier years),
and then hope to add a large LDP
payment to that at harvest, with cash
prices in the low $4 range. Futures
prices over $6 anytime during the
marketing year have been rare, and until
soybean carryout levels drop
significantly, will continue to be elusive.
Given the current farm program
incentives, a significant drop in carryout
likely will occur only with a substantial
production disaster in the United States
or Brazil.

As with corn, average soybean price
levels in both the U.S. and Wisconsin
have moved lower, reflecting the
increase in soybean production. Prices
the last three years have been
consistently below levels that seemed
unachievable just 4 or 5 years ago.
However, because of the relatively lower
per-unit production costs compared to
corn and wheat, and a more attractive
price guarantee through the government
loan program, soybean acres will

The current price levels of energy and
chemical inputs increase the economic
incentives to plant soybeans over corn
and wheat. As a result, if current prices
persist into the planting season, we could
easily see a 1- million-acre increase in
U.S. soybean acres for 2001, and a
corresponding increase in Wisconsin.
Most of the national acreage increase
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will likely occur in the most western and
northern producing states. However, if
high energy prices persist beyond the
2001 production season, soybean
acreage could grow in the central Corn
Belt as well.

Without a significant production
disruption in 2001, futures prices for
soybean delivery in 2001 will be hardpressed to reach the $6 per bushel range,
and will certainly not be sustainable at
that level. Given a normal planting and
production season, the pricing strategy
for soybean producers will be to
maximize LDP payments to enhance
historically low market prices.

The current market environment
suggests that soybean prices will
continue to average in the low to sub-$5
range in the coming year. Producers
who want to maximize pricing
opportunities will need to be prepared to
accept pre- harvest prices at levels
unheard of just a few years ago.

Figure 15: Corn Production
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finance land purchases and
improvements in dairy facilities. Now
that farm incomes are depressed, farmers
will cut back on the use of credit for
capital purchases and instead start
requesting the operating credit they need
to offset operating losses and cash- flow
deficits. The increased demand for
operating credit should be greater than
the cutbacks in demand for capital
credit. Hence total borrowing by farmers
in the coming year should be up
markedly from what it has been the last
few years.

Bruce Jones
(608) 265-8508
Farm Credit
Credit conditions in agriculture are
likely to change substantially in the
coming year if farm income continues to
be depressed. Cash-strapped farmers
will probably be forced to turn to lenders
to meet their short-run cash needs.
Fortunately most farmers should be able
to get needed credit because they have
the equity needed to satisfy their lenders’
credit standards.

Demand for farm real estate loans could
be up substantially in the next year but
not for the purpose of buying land or
financing improvements. Instead,
demand for real estate mortgages will

Farmers’ demand for credit has been on
the rise for the last few years, mostly to
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come from farmers who want to
restructure existing debts. These farmers
will be seeking to negotiate more
affordable principal and interest
payments on their existing loans.
Refinancing debts should ease farmers’
short-run cash flow problems but will
not eliminate the problems that are
rooted in low prices and farm incomes.

point is important because it suggests
that interest rates on real estate
mortgages may be more stable than
operating loan interest rates. Given that
the interest rates on real estate mortgages
tend to be lower and less volatile than
the interest rates on operating loans,
there are some incentives for farmers to
use real estate credit in favor of
operating loans.

Farmers with little or no real estate debt
might be wise to consider mortgaging
their farms and obtaining real estate
credit instead of using operating loans to
offset cash flow deficits. Interest rates
on real estate mortgages tend to be lower
than those charged on operating loans, as
evidenced by the interest rates presented
in Table 6.

There is little reason to believe that
agricultural lenders will be unable to
satisfy the increased credit demands of
farmers. Commercial bankers, the Farm
Credit System and other commercial
lenders are all well positioned to tap into
financial markets and get needed capital
for credit-worthy farmers.

Farm loan interest rate data reported in
the Agricultural Newsletter (issued by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)
show that interest rates on farm real
estate loans have typically been .60 to
1.21 percentage points lower than
interest rates on farm operating loans.
These data also show how the gap
between the interest rates for operating
loans and real estate loans has widened
during the 1995-2000 period. This latter

Just because agricultural lenders have
ready access to capital does not mean
they will respond favorably to every
credit request. These financial
institutions are intermediaries; they are
responsible for insuring that the capital
they obtain in financial markets and loan
to farmers ultimately is returned to the
investors who provided this capita. It is
critical that agricultural lenders make
good on their obligations to investors. If

Table 6: Interest Rates on Farm Loans (For April - June Period) Reported by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
Year

Operating Loans ( % )

Real Estate Loans ( % )

1995

10.24

9.64

1996

9.69

8.81

1997

9.72

8.83

1998

9.54

8.52

1999

9.11

8.18

2000

10.43

9.21
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they do not, they could jeopardize their
access to financial capital in the future.
If this occurs, farmers would no longer
have access to credit.

problems compounded by rising interest
rates. In fact there is a good chance that
interest rates could fall modestly in the
coming year if, as expected, the Federal
Reserve Bank decides to stimulate the
economy by cutting interest rates.
Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan has expressed his concern
about the possibility of recession and
appears to be willing to cut interest rates
in order to counteract the forces that are
slowing down the economy. If the
Federal Reserve Board follows through
with this policy, interest rates could be
heading down. Farmers who are going
to have to increase their borrowing in
2001 would welcome rate cuts.

Therefore, financial lenders are reluctant
to extend credit to farmers who would be
borrowing heavily against land, cows,
machinery and other farm assets. The
probabilities of a default are judged to be
great.
It is understood that a lack of collateral
can prevent some farmers from receiving
credit from commercial banks, the Farm
Credit System, and other commercial
lenders. To help alleviate this collateral
problem, both the federal and state
governments have created some farm
loan guarantee programs. Under these
programs, the government provides loan
guarantees to lenders who are willing to
extend credit to farmers who are unable
to meet the lenders’ collateral standards.
The federal farm loan guarantee program
is administered by the Farm Service
Agency and Wisconsin’s program is run
by the Wisconsin Housing and
Economic Development Authority.

Farmland Values
Things are a little gloomy in the farm
economy given that low commodity
prices have depressed farm incomes.
The situation is not nearly as bleak as it
was in the 1980’s, when farmers’
financial problems were compounded by
a collapse of the farmland market. Back
then, farmland values fell by nearly 50
percent in less than four years. This
collapse of the farm real estate market
was the primary cause of the farm crisis
of the 1980s.

Federal and state farm loan guarantee
programs should enable most farmers to
get the credit they need but there will
still be some farmers who do not qua lify
for credit. These unfortunate individuals
will be forced to go through foreclosure
proceedings or bankruptcy.
Foreclosures and bankruptcies should
not be all that common in the near term,
but, if farm income remained depressed
for an extended period of time, these
events are likely to become more
widespread in the state.

The good news is that farmland values
are holding steady or rising despite the
drop in farm incomes. This stability in
farmland values is a little surprising
given that in the last decade farm
incomes have been on a downtrend.
Economic theory suggests that declining
farm incomes should result in decreasing
farmland values. Since this has not
occurred, we have to conclude that some
factor other than farm income is
influencing the farm real estate market.

At this time it does not appear that
farmers are going to have their financial
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This other factor seems to be the nonfarm real estate market.

farmers’ property taxes were nearly
double the taxes currently paid under the
use- value system.

As shown in Figure 19, in the past few
years Wisconsin’s farm real estate
values have been rising at roughly the
same rate as residential and commercial
property values. This suggests that the
residential and commercial property
markets are driving the Wisconsin
farmland market. This linkage between
the farm and non- farm real estate
markets suggests that, at least in the near
term, farmland values could hold steady.

Now that farmland property taxes are
substantially below historic levels, the
returns from owning farmland are
higher. As such, the value of land is up
because people can expect to earn higher
net returns on land. Thus, the new usevalue assessment system for taxing
farmland should have a positive effect
on real estate values.
Cash Rents for Crop Land

Another factor that could be giving some
support to farmland values is the new
use- value assessment program that is
being used in Wisconsin to levy property
taxes on farmland. Prior to adopting
use- value assessment, Wisconsin
farmers had to pay property taxes based
on the market value of farmland. Under
the market approach to taxing farmland

From 1994 to 2000, per acre rents for
cropland in Wisconsin rose roughly
30 percent, from almost $49 to $65.
This run-up in cash rents was fueled by
relatively strong corn prices in 1997 and
1998 and it has continued even though
market prices for corn have dropped
dramatically the last couple of years.

Figure 19: Real Estate Value Indexes
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On the surface, it would seem that cash
rents should be declining in light of
lower potential earnings from land.
While market prices for corn have
dropped, government payments to
farmers, in the form of loan deficiency
payments, transition payments, and
emergenc y payments, have helped offset
decreases in corn prices and propped up
returns from land. In the absence of
government payments, returns to land
would have fallen and most likely
triggered a reduction in land rents.

D.H. Doster of Purdue University. This
increase comes on the heels of a
5 percent hike in the price of farm inputs
last year.
Doster offers a mixed forecast for
fertilizer prices. He expects anhydrous
nitrogen to be up 30 to 40 percent,
reflecting higher natural gas prices. Urea
nitrogen is expected to be readily
available and prices for this fertilizer are
likely to be unchanged from last year.
Potash prices are expected to remain
relatively low and increase no more than
5 percent in 2001.

The recent increases in farmland rental
rates are in part a function of increased
demands for land. Farmers who are
hard-pressed to make good on their loan
payments and cover their living costs are
aggressively bidding for land, hoping
these additional acres will provide the
income and cash they need to survive.
This competition among farmers has put
upward pressures on land rent in recent
years. Over time this competition for
land should decline as some farmers go
out of business. When this happens, land
rents will decline if commodity prices
stay at current levels. Alternatively, rents
could rise further if commodity prices
recover in the near term. In any case, it
is doubtful farmers can continue to
afford to pay the rents they have been
paying.

Doster forecasts no significant increases
in farm chemical prices. Normally,
higher petroleum prices would be
expected to boost chemical prices.
However competitive pressures and
mergers within the agricultural chemical
industries are keeping chemical
companies from passing on their
increased costs to farmers.
Seed prices are not expected to change
much but the price of newer seed
varieties, which promise higher yields,
could be priced at levels 10 percent
higher than more conventional seeds.
Fuel prices are the big unknown in the
coming year. Last year fuel prices were
up sharply because OPEC nations
tightened crude oil supplies. If OPEC
continues to restrict crude oil supplies,
fuel prices in the coming year are likely
to be as high as they were in 2000.

Production Inputs
Increases of 2 to 5 percent in farm input
prices are predicted for the next year by
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Part III: Special Articles
Outlook for the National Economy and
Agricultural Policies
W.D. Dobson
(608) 262-8965

Emergence of the "Goldilocks"
Economy in the 1990s

This article begins by tracing the
emergence of the "Goldilocks" economy
in the United States during the 1990s.
Then it explains why growth of the U.S.
economy can be expected to continue
slowing in 2001, discusses the economic
environment likely to exist when
development of the 2002 Farm Bill
begins, and describes agricultural policy
provisions that might emerge in 2002
farm legislation.

For much of the 1990s, the United States
had what is often called a Goldilocks
economy. Like the porridge that
Goldilocks found in the story of the
three bears, the economy was not too
hot, not too cold, just right. The
Goldilocks economy with its strong
growth, tame inflation, and relatively
high employment was the envy of the
world during much of the past decade
(See Table 7). The U.S. economy
expanded for a record 118 months
during the 1990s and 2000, often at rates
that in earlier years would have been
considered unsustainable. By serving as
a strong market for exports, the robust
U.S. economy helped to pull Mexico out
of recession in the mid-1990s and Asian
economies out of recession in the late
1990s. And beginning in 1998, the U.S.
economy generated budget surpluses for
the first time since 1969.

It is useful to consider the outlook for
the U.S. economy and that of U.S.
agricultural policy together.
Developments that affect the national
economy will influence the agricultural
policy measures that are needed (and
feasible to include) in the next major
Farm Bill. In particular, growth of the
national economy and consumer income
will influence the demand for
agricultural products and needed levels
of agricultural price supports.
Moreover, the size of federal budget
surpluses will affect the economic
environment that will exist when the
2002 Farm Bill is crafted and influence
the extent to which the Congress and
Administration will be positioned to
support farm commodity prices.

Record increases in stock prices
accompanied the strong performance of
the economy until 2000. Stock prices
increased by over 20 percent per year
during the last half of the 1990s before
becoming volatile, moving sideways and
frequently downward during 2000. The
increase in the value of stock portfolios
produced a wealth effect that spurred
consumer spending and helped to sustain
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high levels of economic growth in the
United States. The wealth effect is not
trivial. A rule of thumb is that the
wealth effect produces $3 to $4 in
consumer spending for each $100
increase in stock market wealth.

oil prices for at least part of the period,
appropriate Federal Reserve interest rate
policies, and the elimination of budget
deficits. The last development reduced
the federal government’s demand for
credit and helped to produce lower
interest rates.

Many things besides the stock market
wealth effect contributed to the
economy’s strength, including
productivity gains associated with
adoption of computer technology,
emergence of "new economy"
companies that emphasized information
technology, a host of other forces that
produced strong corporate earnings, low

Obviously not all sectors of the U.S.
economy prospered during the 1990s.
The U.S. farm economy experienced
problems during the late 1990s,
substantially because of global
overproduction of major crops and
livestock products and weak foreign
demand for U.S. agricultural exports.

Table 7: Growth, Inflation and Unemployment Rates for the U.S. Economy

Year and
Quarter

Real GDP
Growth

Consumer Price
Index

Unemployment
Rate

--Percent-1992
1993
1994
1995
1996

3.0
2.7
4.0
2.7
3.6

2.9
2.7
2.7
2.5
3.3

7.5
6.9
6.1
5.6
5.4

1997
1998
1999
2000:
Q1
Q2
Q3
Q4 (Forecast)

4.4
4.4
4.2

1.7
1.6
2.7

4.9
4.5
4.2

4.8
5.6
2.2
NA

4.3
3.7
3.1
2.7

4.1
4.0
4.0
4.0

Source: Council of Economic Advisers, “Economic Indicators,” November 2000 and
Standard and Poor’s, “U.S. Forecast Summary,” October and November 2000.
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Continued Slowing of the Economy in
2001

orchestrate with six interest rate hikes.
Fed policies and other developments
could produce the soft landing and cause
the economy to grow at a new
sustainable rate of about 3.5 percent per
year. This new growth rate might be
accompanied by relatively tame,
2 percent to 3 percent, inflation and low
unemployment. But less sanguine
outcomes are possible.

The demise of the Goldilocks economy
has been prematurely forecasted before
and forecasters may be wrong yet again.
However, signs point to continued
slowing of the economy in 2001.
Evidence of the slowdown is provided
by the real GDP growth figures for 2000,
which declined from 5.6 percent in
Quarter 2 to 2.2 percent in Quarter 3.
Many factors will contribute to slower
economic growth in 2001. These
include the impacts of the six increases
in the federal funds rate that the Federal
Reserve put in place beginning in mid1999, higher oil and natural gas prices,
weaker corporate earnings, associated
downward movements in stock prices,
lower consumer confidence, weaker
retail sales, tightening of credit,
overcapacity problems in the auto
industry, and the protracted period of
uncertainty over the outcome of the
Presidential election.

Many analysts predict a slower real GDP
growth rate of 3 percent (plus or minus a
half percentage point for 2001). Few
predict an immediate recession.
However, there is a broad consensus that
for now we have seen the last of the
20 percent-plus annual increases in stock
prices witnessed in the last half of the
1990s. Volatile, more normal annual
returns from stocks averaging 8 percent
to 10 percent annually appear likely to
re-emerge during the next few years.
This means that the consumptionenhancing wealth effect of stock market
gains will be lower during the next
several years.

A potentially positive outgrowth of these
developments is a decline in the value of
the U.S. dollar. The U.S. dollar has been
strong relative to the Euro, Japanese yen,
and many other currencies in recent
years in part because of the
attractiveness of investment
opportunities in the United States. As
growth of the economy slows, the U.S.
dollar is likely to weaken relative to the
Euro in particular. This development
should enhance U.S. trade
competitiveness. These developments
will be positive if the decline in the
value of the dollar is gradual.

A soft landing (with a real growth rate of
about 3 percent) is likely to characterize
the behavior of the economy during the
next year or two. What would cause a
recession? (A recession is defined as at
least two consecutive quarters of
declining real growth.) Oil price hikes
might. Given the uncertain political
climate in important foreign supply
areas, higher oil prices are possible.
However, it would take oil prices
sharply higher than the $30 to $35 per
barrel prices that preva iled during much
of late 2000 to cause a recession. This is
partly because oil now represents a
smaller percentage of economic activity
(1 percent to 2 percent of GDP) than in
the late 1970s (when oil was 6 percent to

If all goes well, the economy will make
the “soft landing” that Federal Reserve
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, has tried to
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7 percent of GDP). In the late 1970s, a
run- up in oil prices contributed to a
recession. A Standards & Poor’s model
indicates that oil prices of $40 per barrel
would reduce GDP by 1.3 percentage
points. While this estimate might be
questioned, it is clear that oil price
increases will not have the large impact
recorded in earlier years.

reduction occurred in a short
period of time, it would
virtually guarantee a steep
recession. Since many firms
are also using new stock issues
to finance investment….a stock
crash would likely lead to a
substantial reduction in
investment, further reducing
demand. A market crash also
will lead to a large reduction in
government revenue."

Policy mistakes could contribute to a
recession. Many analysts expect that the
Federal Reserve will hold the federal
funds interest rate unchanged at 6.5
percent until early to mid-2001. The
Fed, fully aware that the economy is
cooling, has moved from its inflation
fighting bias, which might have
necessitated additional interest rate
hikes, to a neutral stance. Its next move
will be to decide when to reduce interest
rates. If the Fed underestimates the
speed at which the economy is slowing,
it may fail to give the economy a needed
boost via a timely interest rate cut. Fed
Chairman, Alan Greenspan, had a
laudable record in preserving the
Goldilocks economy during the 1990s.
But a policy error of this type did
materialize during the U.S. economy’s
last recession in 1991.

Baker’s scenario might be dismissed as
an extreme case. However,
underpinning the scenario is the fact that
the average price/earnings ratio for U.S.
stocks exceeded 30 to 1 in the late 1990s
and early 2000. This is more than twice
the historic average of less than 15 to 1,
suggesting that a 50 percent decline in
stock prices is possible. While it is
unclear what would trigger such a large,
across-the-board stock market
correction, the effects of any such
correction would be damaging.
Impacts of the slowing U.S. economy
will not be uniform across the nation.
Wisconsin, Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and
Illinois, with their high concentration of
smokestack manufacturing industries,
are now strongly feeling the brunt of the
Fed's higher interest rates and
overcapacity in the auto industry. These
states are likely to grow more slowly
than the nation as a whole in 2001,
recording approximately 2.0 percent real
growth rates while the rest of the nation
grows at about a 3 percent real rate.

A wild card is the stock market.
Economist Dean Baker constructed the
following scary but plausible story about
the impact of an additional pronounced
stock market correction in the
September-October, 2000 issue of
Challenge magazine:
"…a 50 percent decline in the
stock market could reduce
annual consumption
expenditures by approximately
$350 billion or approximately
3.8 percent of GDP. If this
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The Economic Backdrop for
Developing the 2002 Farm Bill

Year Federal Budget Surpluses*
1998
1999
2000
2001

The economic environment that will
exist when deliberations on the 2002
Farm Bill begin will reflect
macroeconomic (general economy)
developments as well as those unique to
the farm economy.

$ 69.2 Billion
124.4
237.0
228.0

*Source: Council of Economic Advisers,
"Economic Indicators", November 2000.

Macroeconomic Conditions
Among other things, these conditions
suggest that domestic consumer demand
for agricultural products will be
reasonably strong when deliberations on
the 2002 Farm Bill begin. Less certain is
the strength of export demand for U.S.
farm products. That demand component
is considered below.

To review, the macroeconomic
conditions likely to provide the backdrop
for development of the next major U.S.
Farm Bill include:
•

Slower growth, probably a real
GDP growth rate of 3 percent
plus or minus ha lf a percentage
point.

•

Lower interest rates than existed
in late 2000.

•

Continued relatively low
inflation (consumer price index
increases of 2.5 to 3.5 percent).

•

Modestly lower oil prices than
existed in late 2000.

•

A weaker dollar in foreign
exchange markets.

•

Federal budget surpluses for
2001 and 2002 smaller than the
one forecasted in the schedule
below for 2001. This is probable
because of lower tax revenues
produced by slower economic
growth, a possible tax cut in
2001 or 2002, and adoption of
spending measures advocated
during the 2000 Presidential
campaign.

Conditions in the Farm Economy
The 1996 Farm Bill (officially called the
Federal Agricultural Improvement and
Reform Act and unofficially the
"Freedom to Farm" Act) was passed
when U.S. agricultural exports were
booming, market prices for many
agricultural products were relatively
high, and government support for the
sector was low. The Freedom to Farm
Act represented a departure from farm
programs that had existed since the
1930s. Thus, excluded from the 1996
Farm Bill were acreage reduction
programs (supply control measures) and
target price and deficiency payments for
producers of major crops. Gone too were
the relatively high non-recourse crop
loan rates that had existed in some
previous Farm Bills. The USDA’s dairy
price support program was scheduled for
elimination at the end of 1999.
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In 1998, less than two years after the
1996 Farm Bill was passed, market
prices for many U.S. farm products
began slumping. The lower market
prices stemmed from declining farm
exports and overproduction. The impact
of the drop in farm prices is reflected in
U.S. farm income statistics for 1996 to
2000 (Table 8).

While the increase in direct government
payments to farmers during 1998 to
2000 was large, the payments remained
relatively small as a percentage of total
federal budget outlays. For example,
direct government payments in 1999 and
2000 represented 1.2 percent and 1.3
percent, respectively, of total federal
budget outlays for these years. As
percentages of total federal budget
outlays, the expenditures for direct
government payments to U.S. farmers
for 1999 and 2000 were only about
three-quarters as large as those made
during the depths of the farm recession
in the 1980s.

Crop receipts recorded the largest
reduction, falling $17 billion
(15 percent) during 1997 to 2000.
Aggregate cash receipts from all
livestock remained fairly constant during
1997 to 2000 and were actually
forecasted to record a small (4 percent)
increase from 1997 to 2000. Net cash
farm income also exhibited more
stability than crops receipts, falling
about $3.1 billion (5 percent) from 1997
to 2000. An approximate tripling of
direct government payments to farmers
from 1997 to 2000 cushioned the fall in
net cash farm income.

The depressed cash receipts for crops
during the late 1990s are traceable partly
to increased domestic and world
production and shrinking export
demand. U.S. corn production was a
modest 2.2 percent higher in 1999/2000
than in 1996/97. The increase for the
comparable period for soybeans was a
substantially larger 22 percent. Hit by a
10 percent expansion in domestic

Table 8: U.S. Farm Income Statistics and Agricultural Exports

Receipts
Category

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

93.1
95.5
20.6
54.6
49.1

94.1
100.3
23.3
55.4
50.5

$ Billion
Cash Receipts:
Crops
Livestock
Direct Gov’t. Payments
Net Cash Income
Agricultural Exports

106.3
92.8
7.3
57.6
59.8

111.1
96.5
7.5
58.5
57.3

102.5
94.1
12.2
55.4
53.6

Source: USDA. “Agricultural Outlook,” October and November 2000. Figures for 1999
are preliminary and figures for 2000 are forecasts.
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production and reduced slaughter
capacity, U.S. hog producers saw farm
level hog prices (for hogs not sold under
contracts) drop to Great Depression
levels late in 1998. Beef production
scored smaller increases but did rise by
5 percent to 6 percent from 1997 to
2000. Farm milk prices held up until
late 1999 but have been depressed since
that time, reflecting mostly higher milk
production in California, Idaho, Arizona,
and other Western states.

moderate. However, in the face of weak
foreign demand in important export
markets, U.S. and world prices for
certain agricultural commodities were
pushed sharply lower by these supply
increases.
As noted earlier in Table 8, total U.S.
agricultural exports declined from $59.8
billion in 1996 to $50.5 billion in 2000.
This decline was mostly concentrated in
grain and feeds and to a lesser extent in
oilseeds and products. U.S. grain and
feed exports declined from $21.6 billion
in 1996 to $13.6 billion in 2000
(37 percent) while exports of oilseeds
and products declined from $9.7 billion
in 1996 to $8.7 billion in 2000
(10 percent). The dollar value of most
other U.S. agricultural exports remained
nearly constant or recorded small
increases during this period. While
starting from a low base of $0.7 billion
in 1996, dairy product exports actually
increased by 43 percent during this
period.

The declining export sales of U.S. crops
and livestock products were caused in
part by depressed economic conditions
in Asia and Russia and substantial
increases in world production. The
following schedule shows the percentage
increases in annual average world
production of major agricultural
products from the period approximately
four years before the 1996 Farm Bill to
the period four years after passage of the
1996 Farm Bill.

Product

Coarse Grains
Wheat
Rice
Oilseeds
Oils
Red Meat
Poultry
Milk

Production Increase:
1992/93-1995/96 to
1996/97-1999/00*

Whither U.S. Agricultural Exports? The
USDA forecasts that U.S. agricultural
exports will increase by about $1.0
billion (2 percent) to $51.5 billion in
2001. The Agency expected corn
exports to account for about two-thirds
of the increase in bulk agricultural
exports from 2000 to 2001. This
increase in exports was expected to stem
from lower competition from China and
Eastern Europe and modestly stronger
global demand. However, corn exports
from China now appear likely to be
larger than expected, which translates to
smaller increases in U.S. corn exports
than forecast by the USDA. Exports of
most other U.S. agricultural products are
forecasted to show only minor changes
from 2000 to 2001.

6.4%
8.4
8.1
16.8
17.6
6.8
25.6
1.0

Source: USDA, "Agricultural Outlook",
November 2000.

With several exceptions, the increases
appearing in the above schedule appear
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Agricultural exports are difficult to
forecast. But barring massive crop
failures in foreign markets, it is difficult
to construct realistic scenarios showing
U.S. agricultural exports returning soon
to near the $60 billion per year level
existing when the 1996 Farm Bill was
passed. Moreover, even substantial
production shortfalls in the United States
or elsewhere will not instantly show up
in higher U.S. farm product prices
because it will take time to work off the
large existing stocks.

Program

Percent of Payments*

Emergency Assistance
38%
Loan Deficiency Payments 32
Product Flexibility
Contracts
21
Conservation Reserve
and Other
9
Total
100%
*Source: USDA, "U.S. Farm Programs
Benefits: Links to Planting Decisions
and Agricultural Markets", Agricultural
Outlook, October 2000.

How Payments under the 1996 Farm Bill
were Supplemented. The Congress and
Administration supplemented the
payments to be made to U.S. farmers
under the 1996 Farm Bill to prevent net
cash farm income from falling as sharply
as crop revenues or agricultural exports.
To assess what provisions might be
considered for the 2002 Farm Bill, it is
useful to review the main types of
regular and supplemental government
financial support that were made to U.S.
farmers in 2000.

The largest payment component was
represented by emergency assistance.
Three supplemental legislative packages
passed by Congress and the
Administration since October 1998
provided emergency assistance mostly in
response to low farm commodity prices.
Loan deficiency payments, the second
largest payment category, were
authorized under provisions provided by
the 1996 Farm Bill but were expected to
find little use. Loan deficiency
payments provided about $6.4 billion in
payments to crop producers for fiscal
2000.

The USDA estimates that the $23.3
billion of direct government payments to
U.S. farmers in 2000 will be obtained
from the programs listed below.

When the 1996 Farm Bill was passed
production flexibility contract payments
(sometimes called transition payments)
were thought to represent the main
residual payment to farmers who were
expected to “graduate” to a free market.
But as noted earlier, weakness in
agricultural export markets and global
overproduction short-circuited this
change. The Conservation Reserve
Program, which pays farmers for idling
up to 36 million acres of potentially
erosion-prone farmland, also was part of
the 1996 Farm Bill.
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Dairy farmers have received Market
Loss Assistance Payments and
extensions of the dairy price support
program in the past two years. The most
recent and largest of the Market Loss
Assistance Payments was authorized
under an Agricultural Appropriations bill
signed into Law by President Clinton in
October 2000. Under the program, the
USDA expects to make $650 million in
payments to dairy producers to partially
offset effects of low milk prices. The
capped payments will be made at the
rate of $0.6468 per hundredweight for a
maximum of $25,225 per producer.

of these commodities. Prior to the last
year or so, producers of these
commodities had little received little
support from government programs.
Emergency assistance and other
supplements to the 1996 Farm Bill
prevented sharp reductions in farm
income and farm asset values. Partly
because of the assistance package and
lender and borrower caution, U.S. farm
debt levels did not increase much during
the late 1990s and 2000. The USDA
estimates that farm debt-to-equity and
farm debt-to-asset ratios will rise by less
than 5 percent from 1996 to 2000. U.S.
farm real estate asset values increased by
about 13 percent from 1996 to 2000,
reflecting impacts of the farm assistance
packages, demand for farmland for nonfarm uses, and a host of other
developments. In the U.S. Corn Belt,
farmland prices tended to move
irregularly sideways in the late 1990s.
While assistance measures helped to
keep farm incomes from falling
precipitously, the measures also
produced price signals that prevented
cutbacks in the production of surplus
farm products.

Under the 1996 Farm Bill the dairy price
support program was scheduled to end
on December 31, 1999. In a second oneyear extension, the 2001 Agriculture
Appropriations Bill extended the dairy
price support program through
December 31, 2001 at its current level of
$9.80 per hundredweight for 3.5 percent
butterfat milk.
The federal government supports the
agricultural sector by means in addition
to direct payments to farmers. Thus, in
2000 the federal government provided
support to the agricultural sector through
crop insurance premium subsidies,
marketing loan gains, and price supports
for sugar, peanuts, tobacco, and as noted
above, dairy.

Agricultural Policy Provisions that
Might Emerge in the 2002 Farm Bill
Forecasting the nature of the next major
Farm Bill is fraught with obvious
difficulties. However, if the history of
previous Farm Bill debates is useful as a
guide, the new farm legislation probably
will reflect the following considerations:

In summary, the 1996 Farm Bill failed to
provide politically acceptable levels of
income for U.S. farmers. The export
market, in particular, failed to deliver
results hoped for by architects of the
1996 farm legislation. Other events
conspired to drive prices to exceedingly
low levels for products as diverse as
hogs, cranberries, and apples, creating
demands for assistance from producers

•
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Farmers will not willingly return
to acreage reduction programs
and other farm program
provisions that strip them of the
ability to decide what and how

much to produce. Farmers like
the “Freedom to Farm”
provisions that gave them
discretion about how much of the
different crops to plant each year.
•

Policymakers (and probably
many farmers) will be reluctant
to return to high non-recourse
loan rates that reduce crop
exports. While agricultural
exports are not the powerful
engine supporting crop prices
they once were, they are still
sufficiently important that
policymakers will be reluctant to
do things that would price U.S.
crops out of world markets.

•

While loan deficiency payments
for crop producers required
larger than anticipated budget
outlays under the 1996 Farm Bill,
those provisions provided
support to crop producers
without pricing farm
commodities out of world
markets. Hence, policymakers
may favor them.

•

While they will get an extensive
hearing in the Congress, supply
control measures for major crops
and livestock products are likely
to find limited use in the next
Farm Bill. The economic
inefficiencies associated with
supply controls are likely to
make them difficult to sell to the
diverse producer groups in most
of agriculture.

•

sell. Thus, beef producers will
strongly resist dairy herd buyouts
or related programs that increase
competing market supplies of
beef.

Programs that produce negative
spillovers onto producers of
products other than the object of
the legislation will be a tough
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•

Farmers who received temporary
government assistance in the late
1990s and 2000 (e.g. hog
producers, cranberry producers,
apple producers, etc.) are likely
to seek continued government
support in some form.

•

Although it is difficult to tell just
how binding this constraint will
be, federal budget outlays for
farm programs probably will be
constrained to a greater extent
than in the late 1990s and 2000.
While federal budget surpluses
likely will exist in 2002, tax cuts,
Social Security reform, Medicare
reform, and other claims on the
federal budget will limit
spending on farm commodity
programs. Among other things,
budget constraints will encourage
policymakers to cap total
payments to individual
producers.

•

Major reforms in federal milk
orders that would place dairy
farmers in the Upper Midwest in
a more favorable competitive
position will continue to be
elusive. Small adjustments to
pricing provisions and other finetuning of the orders will be
feasible.

•

Policymakers will view
favorably farm program
expenditures that produce
environmental benefits.

crops, expand farm exports, foster rural
development, foster exit from the farm
sector, and increase antitrust scrutiny of
agribusiness mergers.

Where Do These Considerations Leave
Policymakers?
Obviously, a lot can happen to affect
farm policies between now and late 2001
and 2002 when development of the next
major Farm Bill begins in earnest. But a
few things are likely to shape the 2002
Farm Bill. A return to acreage reduction
programs, target prices, and deficiency
payments would be both expensive in
terms of budget outlays and
objectionable to producers who like
“freedom to farm.” Supply control
measures are getting attention from dairy
groups but there appears to be little
agreement about how supply control
measures might be implemented in ways
that would satisfy groups as diverse as
large, expanding producers and smaller
producers.

The “Holy Grail” sought in the next
Farm Bill will be measures to allow
market prices to facilitate supply
adjustments while providing politically
acceptable farm incomes. But this will
be a difficult task. In practice, effective
decoup ling of payments to farmers from
production decisions has proven to be
difficult.
A Summary Comment
The U.S. economy is in transition,
moving toward slower, probably
sustainable, growth. The directions that
the U.S. farm economy and farm policy
are taking are less clear. The 1996 Farm
Bill was an experiment that, for a
number of reasons, failed to produce
results hoped for by the legislation’s
architects. However, the legislation let a
genie out of the bottle. It gave farmers a
taste of freedom to farm (and emergency
assistance payments) and they liked it.
Producers who hadn’t received much
government support before the late
1990s and 2000 got a taste of it and they
will want to keep it coming. This
suggests that farm legislation will not
revert to legislation that existed before
the 1996 Farm Bill and supplements to
that legislation. Neither are
policymakers likely to have a stomach
for bold experiments akin to the 1996
Farm Bill. This leaves “muddling
through” as the likely option.

The only “sla m dunk” prediction that
can be made is that expansion of the
Conservation Reserve Program beyond
36 million acres is likely. This program,
if properly administered, reduces soil
erosion, provides a limited amount of
broadly acceptable supply control, and
pays farmers for providing services that
enhance the environment. These are
strong pluses.
Perhaps a “muddling through” strategy
will emerge that, in many respects, will
represent a continuation of the
patchwork of programs similar to that
used under the 1996 Farm Bill.
Measures that might receive increased
emphasis include expenditures to
increase production of value-added farm
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Smart Growth and Wisconsin Agriculture
Douglas Jackson-Smith4
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Introduction

the state. Because agricultural planning
had a long history in the state even
before the Smart Growth law, I examine
some of the political and economic
challenges of writing and implementing
effective land use plans in rural
communities. I conclude with a detailed
consideration of what the Smart Growth
law will require concerning agriculture,
and explore some of the ways in which it
could impact farms, the general
agribusiness economy, land markets, and
rural communities in Wisconsin.

Relatively low and volatile agricultural
commodity prices have placed
increasing pressure on the state’s farm
sector in the 1990s. At the same time,
an unusually robust non- farm economy
has generated significant demand for
rural housing and recreational land
development. The result has been a
dramatic acceleration in the rate of
farmland conversion to non- farm uses
over the last 15 years.
Non-farm growth pressures have
affected many other aspects of
Wisconsin’s urban and rural landscape
as well. To help communities grapple
with these new challenges, the state
legislature passed a new “Smart
Growth” law in the fall of 1999 (1999
Wisconsin Act 9). This law encourages
municipalities to write and use new
“comprehensive plans” to guide all their
land use decisions by January 1, 2010.
Under the statute, one required element
of comprehensive plans will be an
assessment of agricultural resources and
a plan for their future use or protection.

Farmland Losses in Wisconsin
Wisconsin has long been one of the
nation’s most important agricultural
states. It currently ranks in the top 10 in
the number of commercial-scale farms,
production of milk, acres of corn and
hay, and net cash income from farming
(USDA, 1999a). Despite the continued
importance of agriculture to its economy
and rural communities, Wisconsin’s
farm sector has been in a state of decline
since the early 1980s. Between 1982
and 1997 overall farm numbers have
fallen by 20 percent, and the number of
dairy farms has fallen by almost half
(Buttel, 1999). While declines in farm
numbers have been a long-term
historical trend in the state, increases in
productivity and expansion among the

This article assesses the significance of
the new Smart Growth legislation for
agriculture in Wisconsin. I begin with
an overview of trends in farmland loss in
4
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continue to own land. 5 Perhaps most
important for the long-run health of the
farm sector, non- farm demand usually
causes farmland values to soar far above
their value as agricultural resources and
thus make it virtually impossible for
young people to afford to buy a farm of
their own.

remaining farms are no longer adequate
to compensate for these losses. As a
result, the value of total gross farm sales
(adjusted for inflation), volume of milk
production, and acres used for farming
have all either stagnated or declined over
the last 15-20 years (USDA, 1999a;
Jackson-Smith, 1996; Jackson-Smith and
Barham, 2000).

From a farmer’s perspective, however,
the inflated land value associated with
development pressure is a double-edged
sword. Certainly high land prices make
it more difficult to enter farming or
expand existing farms. However,
appreciated land values also enable older
or exiting farmers to realize larger
financial gains when they sell their
farmland assets. Proceeds from selling
farmland are often the only source of
retirement funds for older farm families.

Meanwhile, during the 1990s there has
been a steady and almost unprecedented
period of economic growth and
prosperity in Wisconsin’s non-farm
sector. Real wages and personal income
have increased, unemployment rates are
among the nation’s lowest, and
population and housing growth have
been particularly high surrounding many
of the state’s urban centers (WDOC,
1998).
The combination of a depressed farm
economy and a vibrant non- farm sector
has placed pressure on landowners to
convert farmland to other uses.

Rates of Farmland Loss in Wisconsin
Although most observers agree that there
has been a significant decline in the
amount of Wisconsin land used for
farming over the last 20 years, precise
estimates of the magnitude of that
decline differ somewhat. Table 9
presents a number of different estimates
of the acres of farmland in Wisconsin for
selected years between 1978 and 1997.

Generally speaking, non- farm
development can negatively impact the
viability of commercial farms in many
ways. Certainly, non- farm residents
living in close proximity to working
farms can increase nuisance, trespass,
and vandalism complaints. Increased
traffic problems can result from
commuters sharing the road with
agricultural machinery. As land gets
split into smaller parcels, remaining
farmers are forced to deal with more
landlords and travel longer distances to
access rented fields. Increased demand
for public services associated with nonfarm development can also drive up
local property tax rates and make it
increasingly costly for farmers to

The most complete inventory of farming
operations is cond ucted every 5 years
through the U.S. Census of Agriculture.
Census data are collected from all farms
in the state that produced or sold goods
worth at least $1,000 in the Census year.
Census estimates suggest that the state
5

It should be noted, however, that recent
implementation of a Use Value Assessment law
for farmland should buffer the impact of
development-induced rising property taxes on
farmland owners (Sheil, 1996).
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Table 9: Estimated Acres of Farmland In Wisconsin, 1978-1997

Acres of Farmland
1978
1982
1987
1992
1997
Annualized Net
Loss
1978-1982
1982-1987
1987-1992
1992-1997
NOTES:

Farmland
(Census)1

Harvested
Cropland
(Census)2

Farmland
(WASS)3

Land Taxed as
Farmland
(WI-DOR)4

17,838,982
17,234,127
16,606,567
15,463,551
14,900,205

10,062,154
9,863,051
9,335,007
8,843,649
8,625,011

18,800,000
18,500,000
17,700,000
17,300,000
16,800,000

n.a.
n.a.
15,289,791
14,809,872
14,167,746

-151,214
-49,776
-75,000
n.a.
-125,512
-105,609
-160,000
n.a.
-228,603
-98,272
-80,000
-95,983
-112,669
-43,728
-100,000
-128,425
1
Census of Agriculture, various years. Includes all farmland
operated.
2
Census of Agriculture, various years. Includes only harvested
cropland acres.
3
Wisconsin Agricultural Statistics Service estimates, various years.

lost almost 3 million acres (or roughly
16 percent) of farmland between 1978
and 1997. It is worth noting that the
“farmland” reported in the periodic
Census of Agriculture includes a
considerable amount of land on which
crops were not harvested (roughly
42 percent of the total). Because the
Census includes all land that is part of a
Wisconsin farm operation, a good
fraction consists of woodland or
permanent pastureland that is
interspersed within a diversified farm
operation. Hence, while annual
farmland losses reported in the Cens us
ranged from 125,000-229,000 acres per
year, losses of harvested cropland – the
kind of land that springs to mind when
most people imagine the process of
farmland conversion – were in the range

of 44,000-106,000 acres per year
(USDA, 1999).
Using different methods, the Wisconsin
Agricultural Statistics Service
consistently reports somewhat higher
total farmland acreages for the state than
does the Census (WASS, 2000).
Because WASS also finds somewhat
slower annual and total net losses, the
gap between the two estimates appears
to be increasing over time. Both Census
and WASS estimated that roughly
100,000 acres of farmland were taken
out of production each year during the
mid- to late-1990s.
While Census and WASS statistics
suggest that high farmland loss rates
have been with us for at least the last 20
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years, estimates from the state
Department of Revenue indicate a
notable acceleration in the sale and
conversio n of farmland in the last
5-10 years. The final column in Table 8
reflects the total acreage in Wisconsin
that is determined by local property tax
assessors to be in agricultural use. These
tax records suggest that farmland loss
between 1992-1997 increased by
34 percent over the previous 5- year
period. Although not shown on Table 9,
reports of Wisconsin farmland sales
(WASS, 2000) suggest that over 75,000
acres of agricultural land were sold and
converted to non-farm uses each year
between 1993-1997. This represents
nearly three times as many acres as were
reported sold and converted between
1983-1987 (and 20 percent more than
between 1988-1992).

Figure 25). In this context, urbanization
refers to both “hard urbanization”
involving the construction of relatively
densely clustered residential homes or
other commercial and industrial uses, as
well as “rural” urbanization involving
less densely packed rural residential
properties. In addition, a good deal of
farmland has grown up in loosely
managed forests and grasslands. This
suggests that efforts to slow the overall
conversion of farmland in the state will
need to address both near-urban sprawl
as well as the more diffuse process of
rural residential and recreational land
development.

Overall, there has been a growing public
concern that Wisconsin is at risk of
permanently losing some of its best
agricultural soils to pressure from both
urban sprawl and rural recreational land
development. These discussions have
been highlighted by the release of a
recent national study by the American
Farmland Trust that identified the
southeastern quarter of the state as the
third most threatened agricultural area in
the country (Sorenson et al., 1997).

The recently passed Smart Growth law is
certainly not the first time that
Wisconsin state and local governments
have attempted to develop plans to
protect farmland from development.
Since the 1970s, Wisconsin has had a
strong reputation as a national leader in
programs designed to protect farmland
(Daniels and Bowers, 1997). The state
initially adopted a comprehensive
Farmland Preservation Program (FPP) in
1977, which included two
complementary approaches to protect
prime agricultural soils from non-farm
development (Barrows and Yanggen,
1978).

Challenges of Agricultural and Rural
Planning
Agricultural Planning in Wisconsin

Where does all that farmland go?
While significant amounts of cropland
and pasture are withdrawn from
agricultural production each year, it is
not obvious what this farmland is being
used for after conversion. Data from the
USDA National Resource Inventory
(USDA, 1999b) suggest that
urbanization is now responsible for the
majority of farmland converted (See

The first approach provides direct tax
relief to farmers. This is done through
an income tax credit program that offers
credits on state income taxes to farmers
who agree to enroll their farmland in the
FPP program. Enrollees must refrain
from selling or converting their land to
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non- farm uses. Along with the tax
credits, the state FPP also provides
incentives for local governments to
adopt agricultural land use plans and
exclusive agricultural zoning (EAZ)
ordinances (Runde, 1999). The general
idea is to use tax credits to attract
interest in a process of more general land
use planning in rural places, with a
particular emphasis on identifying
important agricultural resource areas and
protecting them from future
development. In order to qualify for the
tax credits at all, farmers had to live in a
county that had an agricultural land use
plan. As a result, by the early 1980s
virtually every county had adopted a
plan that met the standards of the statute
(Emelock, 1989). In addition, to receive
full credits under the tax relief
provisions, farmers have to live in a
town that has adopted an exclusive
agricultural zoning ordinance (or at least
recognized and functioned under a
county EAZ ordinance).

The Social Context of Agricultural
Planning
It is worth noting that maintenance of
agriculture – particularly commercial
scale farms – is typically a central goal
of most town land use plans in
Wisconsin. Indeed, statewide polls
show that the overwhelming majority of
Wisconsin residents are committed to
the idea that protecting farming and
agricultural landscapes is a top land use
planning priority (On Common Ground,
1999).
However, attendance at any town board
meeting quickly reveals an interesting
irony of the local land use decisionmaking process. In most public forums,
it is often the non- farm residents (many
of whom recently moved to their rural
homes) that are the most ardent
supporters of policies discouraging
farmland conversion, while the older
farmers who attend such meetings
frequently seek to preserve their rights to
sell their lands however they see fit as
they plan for their own retirements. In
essence, a traditional rural ethic
respecting individual property rights and
the “independence” of family farmer
decision- making has begun to conflict
with a growing public and private
interest in regulating the impacts of farm
landowner decisions on the quality of
life in the community as a whole.

Because of the FPP incentives, many
town governments now have adopted
land use plans (Ohm and Schmidtke,
1999) and EAZ ordinances. A review of
state records suggests that almost
70 percent of towns now operate under
some type of general zoning ordinance,
and over 40 percent of towns enforce
specific EAZ ordinances, either
themselves, or through their county. The
most active counties and towns have
periodically revised their land use plans
and ordinances to conform to shifting
community priorities and concerns.
Others still operate under the terms of
their original plans, most of which were
adopted between 1979 and 1981.

To be fair, the interests and priorities of
“farmers” are usually muc h more
complex. Surveys have shown that the
farm community as a whole is quite
sympathetic to the idea that some
restrictions should be placed on the pace
and type of development that occurs in
their communities (Jackson-Smith,
2000). However, a sizeable majority of
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farmers also think that farmers should be
compensated for agreeing to limit their
options to sell land as they see fit.
Moreover, surveys and informal
conversations reveal that nearly all
Wisconsin farmers have a desire to see
farming continue on their land after they
retire – if they thought it could be done
profitably.

gain political support for the program,
farmers in every county across the state
were made eligible for tax relief,
spreading a limited total amount of
public investment across a relatively
large number of potential recip ients.
This lack of targeting makes fewer
dollars available in the regions where the
threats to agricultural land are greatest.
More importantly, the original per acre
tax relief benefits have not been indexed
to inflation. As a result, the value of the
credit is increasingly small relative to the
financial rewards gained from selling the
land for development. Indeed, in most
of the urbanizing and near-urban
counties in Wisconsin the net benefits of
converting farmland to non-farm uses
may exceed the annual value of the FPP
credit by ten to twenty times or more.
The recent move towards use value
assessment of farmland is likely to
further decrease the tax credit benefits.
Finally, FPP payback provisions have
not served as much of a disincentive for
pulling land out of the program.

Farmer views are also affected by the
age of the farm operator and the type of
farm they operate. While older farmers
have a deep interest in protecting the
value of their land investments, younger
and mid-career farmers recognize that
higher land prices can adversely impact
the viability of their own farms. Large
commercial farmers – who have made
investments in the future of their
industry – tend to be more supportive of
restrictions on development than do
operators of part-time or sub-commercial
farms.
Non-farmers also represent a much more
heterogeneous group than they are often
given credit for. While an increasing
number of rural citizens have decidedly
urban backgrounds, the vast majority of
Wisconsin’s non- farm rural residents are
long-term residents who have personal
ties to the farm sector. As a result, they
frequently share the same cultural values
and political viewpoints as their farming
neighbors, and also express conflicting
views about the necessity of community
regulation of local land use decisions.

Given the limitations of tax-credit
programs to saving farmland, local
municipalities have increasingly relied
on the use of regulatory approaches to
prevent unwanted development and to
protect agricultural and natural
resources. Typically these regulatory
programs involve some combination of
land use planning and zoning. Indeed,
most Wisconsin town or county board
meetings in the last five years have been
dominated by citizen requests to divide
or rezone agricultural lands for the
purposes of single home development.
In most cases, it is the local land use
plans, combined with building permit,
land division, and zoning ordinances,
that provide guidance to those who must
make decisions on these requests.

Lessons learned from 20 years of
Farmland Preservation Planning in
Wisconsin
Wisconsin’s Farmland Preservation
Program has been specifically criticized
on a number of grounds. Initially, to

49

In principle, planning and zoning should
provide a firm line of defense for the
preservation of farmland. Communities
identifying farmland preservation as a
goal can (and usually do) establish
restrictive “agricultural zones” that
prohibit most residential or nonagricultural commercial development.
Assuming that these ordinances are
rigorously enforced – i.e., that waivers,
variances, or rezoning are rare – it is
likely that there will be noticeably less
development on protected agricultural
lands.

minimum lot sizes of at least 35 acres in
order for property to be zoned for
“exclusive agriculture” and hence to
receive maximum income tax credit
benefits. The logic behind large- lot
zoning is that 35 or 40-acre parcels will
be unattractive to non- farm rural
homebuyers, and that these large parcels
have the potential to be viable
agricultural units. In addition, large lot
sizes help maintain relatively low overall
population density and also preclude
unwanted concentrations of new houses
in a confined area.

In practice, two sorts of problems are
often encountered with planning and
zoning for agriculture. First, though
land use plans may state that
preservation of agricultural lands is a top
priority, local government officials may
find it difficult to turn down all
development proposals that would
infringe upon agricultural property. This
is particularly true in rural areas when
the farmland owner is a former
commercial farmer with few retirement
savings, and someone who has been a
longtime resident of the area with close
ties to the local officials. Many
farmland preservation plans are also
written without a full consideration of
the complexity associated with
enforcement or implementation,
particularly when planning is done
simply to meet state or federal
requirements. In such cases the plan
may not be used as a binding document
for making land use decisions.

After twenty to thirty years of
experience, large- lot zoning approaches
have been roundly criticized on a
number of grounds. Initially, it is clear
that modern agriculture requires
significantly more acres, often upwards
of 300-400 acres per farm, than typical
minimum lot sizes allow to be
economically viable. 6 Moreover, it has
been shown that 35-40 acre parcels are
still quite attractive to non- farm
residents seeking to build a home in the
country, particularly where rural land
prices are low compared to prices for
lots within or on the margins of urban
areas. In Wisconsin, “the 35-acre rule”
associated with the FPP-EAZ statute has
encouraged many municipalities to
approve a significant number of rural
residential homes on relatively large lots.
In aggregate, it is likely that significantly
more farmland acreage has been
withdrawn from agriculture – in large 35
or 40 acre chunks – because of the large

A second potential problem with rural
and agricultural planning and zoning is
reflected in the conventional practice of
large- lot zoning to protect farming and
other natural resources. In Wisconsin,
for example, state law has required

6

Of course, some types of high-value, lowacreage agriculture (like market gardening,
greenhouses, and horticultural operations) can be
viable on much less than 35 acres, but these are
usually economically and numerically much less
significant than traditional farm commodity
producers.
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minimum lot size requirement than
would have been the case if the law had
allowed a similar number of
developments but permitted them on
smaller parcels. Even when non- farm
landowners choose to rent out their
excess farmland, parcelization of the
landscape in the long run makes farming
more difficult and impractical for the
remaining commercial farm operators.

That does not necessarily mean that
planning or zoning cannot be useful
tools in the effort to save farmland.
Indeed, the results of a parallel in-depth
study of farmland losses in Dane County
suggest that strong local land use plans
and ordinances are a necessary but not
sufficient condition for an effective
farmland preservation policy (Bukovac,
1999). In particular, the most important
factor influencing a town’s ability to
slow farmland loss is its willingness to
strictly enforce the language in their
plans and ordinances. Towns with
relatively strong farmland protection
language in their land use plans, but who
frequently approved rezoning proposals
that were inconsistent with their stated
policies typically lost farmland much
more rapidly. Meanwhile, towns with
relatively modest plan language, but who
were able to muster the political will to
consistently deny requests for
development that violated farmland
protection provisions fared relative ly
well. Those with no plans or ordinances
tended to consistently lose farmland
rapidly, though not necessarily faster
than those failing to enforce their local
plans.

Along with passing the Smart Growth
law, recent changes in state statutes also
removed the 35-acre criteria traditionally
associated with EA zoning. After
January 1, 2001 a municipality can
decide to have any sized lot in an EA
zone. However, this change will still not
permit landowners in EAZ areas to do
anything with their land that may be
incompatible with surrounding
agricultural uses. Moreover, to qualify
for receiving tax credits under the FPP, a
landowner will have to have at least 35
acres in their parcel.
A recent statistical analysis of spatial
patterns of farmland loss suggest that the
Wisconsin Farmland Preservation
Program (FPP) income tax credits have
produced some of their intended benefits
(Jackson-Smith and Bukovac, 2000).
Overall, the rate of conversion was
lower in towns where more people had
enrolled farmland acreage in the FPP
and claimed it on their taxes. Moreover,
the benefits from FPP income tax credits
are most clear in towns that have dense
populations already and that face the
highest rates of housing development.
Meanwhile, the presence or absence of
general zoning or exclusive agricultural
zoning ordinances in Wisconsin towns
did not appear to be systematically
related to the pace of farmland
conversion.

Wisconsin’s New Smart Growth Law
The passage of Wisconsin’s “Smart
Growth” statute in the fall of 1999
provides both a structured framework
and a new opportunity for all Wisconsin
communities to engage in agricultural
planning. The “Smart Growth” title of
the law comes from the observation that
many past planning and zoning activities
have promoted patterns of residential
and commercial development that
consume large amounts of land, increase
fiscal stress on communities, and
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otherwise adversely affect the quality of
life in the state by creating eyesores,
traffic problems, and damaging natural
resources. The basic principles of smart
growth include reinvigorating
development within urban areas,
reducing the average lot size of housing
development, protecting natural
resources, and encouraging development
along existing (or planned)
transportation corridors. Many states
and municipalities have embraced smart
growth principles across the United
States in recent years.

To meet the requirements of the statute,
comprehensive plans will have to
include at least 9 key elements:

From agriculture’s point of view, the
new statute does a number of key things.
First, it provides a legal definition of a
comprehensive plan. These plans are
“comprehensive” mainly because they
simultaneously cover the full range of
topics that traditionally have been the
focus of disconnected planning efforts.
Specifically, agricultural planning will
increasingly be integrated into other
related planning activities like housing,
environmental, and economic
development planning. Second, the law
requires a more explicit public
participation process during plan
development and plan implementation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, if
a local municipality wants to make any
kind of decision that affects land use, the
law requires that by January 1, 2010 they
must adopt a legal comprehensive plan
and ensure that all their other land use
decisions are consistent with that plan.
The legislation provides some financial
assistance to local municipalities (in
terms of planning grants) and includes
provisions for paying incentives – or
“smart growth dividend aids” – to
communities that have successfully
adopted comprehensive plans meeting
certain basic standards.

Since agricultural land represents the
dominant land use for the majority of
Wisconsin towns and counties – and
because most residential and commercial
development is likely to occur on
agricultural land – it is likely that the
Smart Growth legislation will initiate a
new round of agricultural planning
activity in the state. Agriculture is
specifically mentioned in the fifth
required element, which requires:

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
i)

Issues and opportunities
Housing
Transportation
Utilities and community facilities
Agricultural, natural and cultural
resources
Economic development
Intergovernmental cooperation
Land use
Implementation

“A compilation of objectives,
policies, goals, maps and
programs for the conservation,
and promotion of the effective
management, of natural resources
such as groundwater, forests,
productive agricultural areas,
environmentally sensitive areas,
threatened and endangered
species, stream corridors, surface
water, floodplains, wetlands,
wildlife habitat, metallic and
nonmetallic mineral resources,
parks, open spaces, historical and
cultural resources, community
design, recreational resources
and other natural resources.”
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Although the FPP encouraged most
counties and many towns to develop
agriculturally oriented land use plans,
the new Smart Growth law will probably
require these same municipalities to
revisit their plans and policies. In fact, it
is likely that many municipalities will
seek to adopt a new comprehensive plan
that also meets the requirements of
agricultural planning provisions of the
original Farmland Preservation statutes.
At the same time, many communities
will be thinking through their
agricultural planning and policies for the
first time.

comprehensive plan, in most places
agriculture is likely to permeate many
other aspects of a well- written plan. For
example, any assessment of the “issues
and opportunities” in a rural agricultural
community is likely to engage the debate
over protecting farmers and farmland
from non- farm development. Moreover,
the subcomponents of comprehensive
plans that address the protection of local
natural resources will inevitably need to
consider farm issues, since agricultural
land use has significant impacts on the
environment. In a different sense, the
economic development plan element in
many communities may well explore
ways that local municipalitie s can
facilitate farm modernization, local
value-added farm commodity
processing, and creation of new markets
for local agricultural products. Since
housing development on farm fields
appears to be a primary land use concern
in most parts of rural Wiscons in, any
successful housing plan element will
need to address how an affordable and
adequate supply of housing can be
provided while still protecting
agricultural resources. Finally, because
agricultural lands are at the center of
many land use and intergo vernmental
squabbles, agriculture is likely to be a
prominent component of the required
land use and intergovernmental elements
of Smart Growth plans.

In both cases, the biggest change
resulting from the new law is the fact
that new comprehensive plans will
eventually become legally binding
documents that have to be used as the
basis for all future land use decisions.
This is a dramatic departure from past
practices, where agricultural plans were
often seen as general guidelines with
little real enforcement power, and even
sometimes forgotten or ignored outright.
Typically an agricultural planning
process will go through several key
steps: (i) conducting an analysis of
recent agricultural trends and the current
situation; (ii) identifying a set of goals
and objectives that reflect community
and individual values regarding the
future use of agricultural land; (iii)
developing policies that help guide
future land use decisions; and (iv)
writing “implementation tools” – such as
zoning ordinances, land division and
subdivision ordinances, driveway and
building permit procedures, and other
local regulations.
While agricultural planning is a required
subcomponent of just one of the nine
elements in a Smart Growth

It is clear that the Smart Growth law will
generate a significant new round of
agricultural planning in Wisconsin.
However, it is not clear that
communities are well equipped to meet
the challenges discussed above. Most
rural towns and many rural counties rely
on citizen volunteers and lack detailed
information about the status of farming
and direction of agricultural change in
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their area. Even when they identify
agriculture as something they want to
protect, it is likely that they will need
new and better information to help them
clarify their goals and evaluate different
policy approaches to protecting farmers
and farmland. Given the limited
successes associated with agricultural
planning in the past, new data and
information, better and more realistic
land use policies, and support from both
the public and private sector are critical
to future efforts. The greatest challenge
will be to devise agricultural planning
approaches that balance the interests of
individual farmland owners on the one
hand, and those of their neighbors and
the community as a whole on the other.
Since comprehensive planning does not
require any specific kind of goal or
policy (all it requires is that certain
issues get examined and considered, it is
likely that each community will want to
find its own “comfort- zone” that reflects
its own situation and unique mix of
values and beliefs.
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Figure 25: Percent of all Cropland and Pasture Converted out of
Agricullture in Wisconsin, 1992-1997, by New Land Use
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The Wisconsin Agricultural Economy: A Broader Perspective
Steven Deller (608) 263-6251
Bruce Jones (608) 265-8508

Wisconsin has been experiencing a
sustained period of economic growth. In
the 21-year period between 1977 and
1998 (the most current year reported),
personal income grew by 313 percent in
Wisconsin. This growth level compares
favorably to the Eastern Plain States
(Ohio, Michigan, Indiana and Illinois),
where personal income grew by
320 percent, and the Western Plain
States (Minnesota, Iowa, and the
Dakotas), which grew by 274 percent. A
similar pattern emerges when examining
Gross State Product (GSP). Wisconsin’s
GSP grew by 286 percent between 1977
and 1998 while the Eastern and Western
Plain States grew by 288 percent and
254 percent respectively. While the
recession of the early 1980s was
particularly hard on Wisconsin, the most
recent recession of the early 1990s was
barely felt in most of Wisconsin.
Although there have been recent
concerns about the quality of the jobs
being created in this period of economic
growth, in particular wage levels, the
Wisconsin economy has been growing
as strong if not stronger than
neighboring states.

patterns for farm income and farm gross
state product over the past twenty years.
Based on a simple five-period moving
average, gross state product from farms
grew by about 25 percent from 1977 to
now, a growth rate which is significantly
slower than Wisconsin’s overall
economic growth. Again using a simple
five period moving average, personal
income attributed to farming, however,
experienced more than a 25 percent
decline. When directly comparing the
overall growth in Wisconsin total
personal income to farm-related personal
income (Figure 26), a disturbing picture
becomes readily apparent: Wisconsin’s
farming economy has not taken part in
state’s broader economic growth. In
other words, although farm output in
Wisconsin is growing modestly, farm
income is declining.
The fact that net farm income has been
declining as total farm output has been
increasing is evidence that farm profit
margins are narrowing over time. In the
early 1980s the average profit margin for
Wisconsin farmers was around
25 percent; allowing farmers to earn
roughly 25 cents of profits per dollar of
output. Farm profit margins in recent
years have fallen to roughly 15 percent.
This 10-cent decline in the profits
farmers earn per dollar of total output is
the result of falling output prices and
rising input costs.

The agricultural economy, unfortunately,
has not experienced the same level of
prosperity over the past 20-plus years.
Farm income historically has been
volatile, subject to constantly changing
domestic and foreign farm policies,
weather, and structural changes within
the industry itself. This volatility is
clearly evident when examining growth
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The erosion of farm profit margins is an
outcome of the competitive forces that
are at work in agriculture. Farmers
attempting to survive in the industry are
simultaneously paying higher prices for
inputs and boosting production in an
attempt to raise or maintain their
incomes. This increase in farm
production puts downward pressures on
farm commodity prices, which
ultimately translates into even narrower
farm profit margins.

Increasing farm sales coupled with a
declining number of farm
proprietorships is a reflection of the
consolidation that is occurring in
farming not only in Wisconsin, but also
across the nation. The Eastern Plain
States experienced about a 25 percent
decline in the number of farm
proprietors while the Western Plain
States experienced a 23 percent decline.
Declining farm numbers coupled with
increased farm sales, unfortunately, does
not necessarily translate into higher per
proprietor income. For Wisconsin farm
proprietors, the five-year average per
proprietor income between 1977 and
1981 was $13,400 but only $8,100 for
the five- year average between 1994 and
1998. If one adjusts for the affects of
inflation, the decline in per farm
proprietor income is even more
pronounced.

The narrow profit margins that currently
exist in farming are too low to sustain all
the farm businesses that are currently
operating in the state. But farm exits are
not likely to improve profit margins in
the near term. Farmers who remain in
business will acquire the land, cows, and
other assets of exiting farmers and then
use these assets to maintain output. The
margins earned on this output will
continue to be low, but sufficient to
support those farms that produce large
volumes of output. This movement to
large-scale farming will likely continue
as long as margins remain tight.

The low proprietary incomes reported
for Wisconsin farmers suggest that many
farm households need other sources of
income. According to USDA, roughly
87 percent of farm household income for
farms in the Lake States region (which
includes Wisconsin) was from non- farm
sources in 1995. 8 This heavy
dependence of farm households on nonfarm income is not surprising in light of
the fact that average farm earnings are
well below the U.S. average household
income, which was reported at roughly
$45,000 in the 1995 Current Populatio n
Survey of the Bureau of the Census.

In addition to gross state product (i.e.,
net value added) and farmers’ income
(i.e., personal income), a common
measure of industry growth is the
number of firms, or proprietors, in
operation. As noted in Figure 27,
between 1977 and 1998 the number of
non- farm proprietors increased by about
63 percent. The number of farm
proprietors, however, declined by about
19 percent. 7
7

This reported decline in farm numbers masks
larger declines in the number of farms for which
farming is the principal source of income. In
recent years, farm numbers have actually
increased, as rural more residences have

technically become “farms” because sales
exceeded definitional standards.
8
Structural and Financial Characteristics of
U.S. Farms, 1995: 20th Annual Family Farm
Report to the Congress (December 1998)

58

The 1997 Census of Agriculture
provides additional evidence that
Wisconsin farm households are
increasingly relying on non-farm income
to supplement low farm incomes.
Census data show that almost 40 percent
of Wisconsin farms had operators
working at least 200 days off their farms.

Wisconsin, 140 percent for the Eastern
Plain States, but significantly higher in
the Western Plain States, which showed
a 250 percent increase. The accelerated
increase in the value of agricultural
processing’s product relative to earnings
in the Western Plain States is reflective
of the vertical integration of certain key
agricultural sectors such as the meat
packing industry. Serious concern has
been expressed about the impact that
such integration has had on the quality
of jobs within the sector. While the
simple analysis presented here does not
suggest such a concern is warranted for
Wisconsin at this time, national trends
magnified in the Western Plain States
may point to future issues for
Wisconsin’s agricultural economy.

If farm profit margins continue to be
tight, smaller farm operators will be
forced to seek off- farm employment if
they intend to stay on their farms. The
extent to which these farmers are
successful in gaining off- farm
employment depends on the strength of
Wisconsin non-farm economy. A robust
non- farm economy, such as we have
seen in recent years, should give farmers
good opportunities to get the off farm
jobs they will be seeking. Alternatively,
a slow down in the non- farm economy
could make it difficult for farmers to
gain employment and earn the off- farm
incomes they need to supplement their
farm business earnings.

Comparing overall growth in earnings
and gross state product for Wisconsin
with growth in the farm production and
agricultural processing sectors shows a
clear pattern (Figures 28 and 29). As the
overall state economy continues to grow,
the more moderate growth of
agricultural processing and the
stagnation of farm production is causing
agriculture to contribute an increasingly
smaller share to the overall economy. In
1977, farming contributed $1.9 billion to
Wisconsin’s gross state product, or about
4.6 percent of the total, and agricultural
processing contributed $1.7 billion or
4.2 percent. In 1998, the most current
year for which data are available,
farming contributed $2.5 billion to gross
state product or only 1.6 percent whereas
agricultural processing added $4.3
billion or 2.7 percent (Figure 30).

An integral part of the Wisconsin
agricultural economy is the processing
sector, referred to as the food and
kindred products industry. For
Wisconsin this includes cheese plants,
vegetable canners and breweries, to
name but a few. For the period 1977 to
1998, earnings from the agricultural
processing sector increased by
150 percent in Wisconsin, about
158 percent for the Western Plain States
and 117 percent for the Eastern Plain
states. Growth in industry output, or
industry sales for agricultural
processing, is about 150 percent for
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The key to preserving Wisconsin’s
agricultural processing sector is in the
maintenance or growth of the farm
sector. Food processors need access to
raw agricultural products. Where
processors get those raw products
depends on Wisconsin farmers. If

farmers can meet the needs of
processors, processors will continue to
do business in the state. If Wisconsin
farmers fail to meet the raw product
needs of processors, then processors will
scale back or shut down their Wisconsin
operations.

A note on measures of economic activity
This article uses the concept of Gross State Product (GSP) to permit an “apples to
apples” comparison of farming and food processing with other sectors of the state’s
economy. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the federal agency
responsible for estimating GSP:
GSP is the value added in production by the labor and
property located in a state. In concept, an industry’s GSP,
referred to as its “value added,” is equivalent to its gross
output (sales or receipts and other operating income,
commodity taxes, and inventory change) minus its
intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services
purchased from other U.S. industries or imported). Thus,
GSP is often considered as the state counterpart of the
nation’s gross domestic product (GDP). In practice, GSP
estimates are measured as the sum of the distributions by
industry and State of the components of gross domestic
income – that is, the sum of the costs incurred and incomes
earned in the production of GDP.
GSP is not value of production or industry shipments, nor is it the same as other
measures of value added (value of output less cost of goods sold). For instance, cash
receipts from Wisconsin farm marketings in 1998 were $6.1 billion. This compares to
GSP from farming of $2.5 billion. The Census of Manufacturers shows the value of
shipments for Wisconsin food processing firms in 1997 at $20.6 billion, 17.5 percent of
the total value of shipments for all Wisconsin manufacturing industries. The Census
further showed value added by this sector in 1997 at $6.7 billion, 12 percent of the state
total. In contrast, GSP from the food and kindred products sector was only $4.3 billion in
1998.
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Figure 26: Trends in Wisconsin Income
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Figure 27: Trends in Number of Wisconsin Proprieters
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Figure 28: Trends in Wisconsin Earnings
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Figure 29: Trends in Gross State Product
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Fiure 30: Distribution of Wisconsin Gross State Product
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